The foregoing pages tell of the results achieved by air power in each of its several roles in the war in the Pacific, including the effects of the atomic bombs. The Survey has already reported on the results achieved by air power in the European war. It remains to seek out the degree to which the Pacific study modifies, adds to or supports the signposts to the future which were suggested by the European study; to state the extent to which hindsight suggests that air power might have been differently or better employed in the Pacific; to discuss the impact of the existence of atomic bombs on the role of air power; and to state the Survey’s recommendations.
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Nov
30
2009
The rest of that day is history. Personally, I spent it praying for the invaders … and, like the rest of his official family, aching with sympathy for our apprehensive Boss.
Gen Eisenhower stood the appalling strain for another day. Then, in the early morning of June 7 it was 0720-H, just twenty-six hours after H-Hour he left for Normandy’s beaches. I fled to the lonely comfort of our trailer-headquarters. Working on the General’s “fan mail” never seemed so difficult, so unimportant; but it helped smother worries.
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Jul
13
2009
CHAPTER II
Planning the Counteroffensive
Details of the Plan
About 25 September Generalorberst Alfred Jodl was ordered to begin a detailed analysis of the Hitlerian concept, the only function now left to the great General Staff. Some latitude remained to the individual staff officers and those favored few in the high echelon of command who retained access to the Führer in kneading and shaping the very general outline handed down by Hitler into an operations plan. The outline as it now had taken shape contained these major points :
- (a) the attack should be launched sometime between 20 and 30 November;
- (b) it should be made through the Ardenne in the Monschau – Echternach sector;
- (c) the initial object would be the seizure of bridgeheads over the Meuse River between Liège and Namur;
- (d) thereafter, Antwerp would be the objective;
- (e) a battle to annihilate the British and Canadians would ultimately be fought north of the line Antwerp, Liège, Bastogne (1);
- (f) a minimum of thirty divisions would be available, ten of which would be armored;
- (g) support would be given by an unprecedented concentration of artillery and rocket projector units;
- (h) operational control would be vested in four armies and two panzer armies abreast in the lead, two armies composed largely of infantry divisions to cover the flanks;
- (i) the Luftwaffe would be prepared to support the operation;
- (j) all planning would aim at securing tactical surprise and speed;(k) secrecy would be maintained at all costs and only a very limited number of individuals would be made privy to the plan.
Jul
11
2009
Category : Airborne Operations, Archives Movies, Fallschirmjäger, German Airborne
Section 8
Reflection on the Absence of Russian Air Landings
It is surprising that during World War II the USSR did not attempt any large-scale airborne operations. Although Soviet Russia was the first country in the world which during peacetime had experimented with landing troops by air and had organized special units for this purpose*, its wartime operations were confined to the commitment of small units which were dropped back of the German front for the purpose of supporting partisan activities and which had no direct tactical or strategic effect. The reasons can only be surmised and might have been any or all of the following :
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Jul
11
2009
Section 4
Air Transported Troops
The original German plan to use Army troops for this purpose and to equip and train them accordingly was abandoned early in the war. The 22. Infanterie Division, which had been selected in peacetime for the purpose, participated in airborne operations only once, in Belgium and in Holland in 1940. It was found that their double equipment-one set for regular ground combat, the other for use in air-landing operations constituted an obstacle; consideration for their special mission limited their employment for ground combat. When a fresh commitment in line with their special mission became a possibility in Crete, it was found impossible to bring them up in time. On the other hand, as early as the Norway campaign, mountain troops were flown for commitment at Narvik without much prior preparation. While in this case non tactical transport by air was involved, the previously mentioned commitment in 1941 of the 5. Gebirgsjaeger Division in the airborne operation against Crete took place after only short preparation and was entirely successful.
On the basis of these experiences the idea of giving individual Army units special equipment for airborne operations was abandoned. The German High Command set about finding ways and means to adapt all Army units for transport by air with a minimum of changes in their equipment. The results were never put into practice because after Crete the Germans did not undertake any other airborne operations on a large scale. Crete, however, proved that the German mountain troops, because of their equipment and the training which they had received, as well as their combat methods, were particularly suited for missions of this nature. In the future the goal must be to find a way of committing not only mountain and infantry divisions but panzer and motorized formations in airborne operations. Their equipment and organization for this purpose will depend upon the evaluation of technical possibilities which cannot be discussed in detail here. The chief demand which the military must make upon the technical experts is that the changes required for such commitment be kept to a minimum. A way must be found to determine the best method for such a change so that the troops can undertake it promptly at any time.
Jul
10
2009
This study was written for the Historical Division, EUCOM, by a committee of former German officers. It follows an outline prepared by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Special Staff, United States Army, which is given below :
1-A) A review of German airborne experience in World War II
1-B) An appraisal of German successes and failures
1-C) Reasons for the apparent abandonment of large-scale German airborne operations after the Crete operation
2-A) German experience in opposing Allied and Russian airborne operations
2-B) An appraisal of the effectiveness of these operations
3-A) The probable future of airborne operations.
It is believed that the contributors to this study represent a valid cross-section of expert German opinion on airborne operations. Since the contributors include Luftwaffe and Army officers at various levels of command, some divergences of opinion are inevitable; these have been listed and, wherever possible, evaluated by the principal German author. However, the opinions of Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring are given separately and without comment wherever they occur in the course of the presentation. The reader is reminded that publications of the German Report Series were written by Germans and from the German point of view. Organization, equipment, and procedures of the German Army and Luftwaffe differ considerably from those of the United States armed forces.
This study is concerned only with the landing of airborne fighting forces in an area occupied or controlled by an enemy and with the subsequent tactical commitment of those forces in conventional ground combat. The employment of airborne units in commando operations, or in the supply and reinforcement of partisans and insurgents, is not included in this study, nor is the shifting of forces by troop-carrier aircraft in the rear of the combat zone. Such movements, which attained large size and great strategic importance during World War II, should not be confused with tactical airborne operations.
