On January 2, 1942, 33 members of a Nazi spy ring headed by Frederick Joubert Duquesne were sentenced to serve a total of over 300 years in prison. They were brought to justice after a lengthy espionage investigation by the FBI. William Sebold, who had been recruited as a spy for Germany, was a major factor in the FBI’s successful resolution of this case through his work as a double agent for the United States. A native of Germany, William Sebold served in the German army during World War I. After leaving Germany in 1921, he worked in industrial and aircraft plants throughout the United States an South America. On February 10, 1936, he became a naturalized citizen of the United States. Sebold returned to Germany in February, 1939, to visit his mother in Mulheim. Upon his arrival in Hamburg, Germany, he was approached by a member of the Gestapo who said that Sebold would be contacted in the near future. Sebold proceeded to Mulheim where he obtained employment.
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Jul
13
2009
CHAPTER II
Planning the Counteroffensive
Details of the Plan
About 25 September Generalorberst Alfred Jodl was ordered to begin a detailed analysis of the Hitlerian concept, the only function now left to the great General Staff. Some latitude remained to the individual staff officers and those favored few in the high echelon of command who retained access to the Führer in kneading and shaping the very general outline handed down by Hitler into an operations plan. The outline as it now had taken shape contained these major points :
- (a) the attack should be launched sometime between 20 and 30 November;
- (b) it should be made through the Ardenne in the Monschau – Echternach sector;
- (c) the initial object would be the seizure of bridgeheads over the Meuse River between Liège and Namur;
- (d) thereafter, Antwerp would be the objective;
- (e) a battle to annihilate the British and Canadians would ultimately be fought north of the line Antwerp, Liège, Bastogne (1);
- (f) a minimum of thirty divisions would be available, ten of which would be armored;
- (g) support would be given by an unprecedented concentration of artillery and rocket projector units;
- (h) operational control would be vested in four armies and two panzer armies abreast in the lead, two armies composed largely of infantry divisions to cover the flanks;
- (i) the Luftwaffe would be prepared to support the operation;
- (j) all planning would aim at securing tactical surprise and speed;(k) secrecy would be maintained at all costs and only a very limited number of individuals would be made privy to the plan.
Jul
12
2009
Case/Goering Hermann
Translation by Herma Plummer
Information supplied by Franz Peter Weixler
Krailling, near Munich
November 11 1945
In connection with the Nurnberg trials against/et. al., I would like to make the following statement with the express authorization that it may be used in the trial.
I was a prisoner of the Gestapo from January 16 1944 to April 1945. I had been indicted for treason before the People’s Court and the only reason I was not executed was the fact that my files were destroyed once in Berlin, and once at the Gestapo office in Nurnberg. One of the reasons for my indictment was the fact that I had told friends the truth about the parachute enterprise in Crete in May 1941, and also that I had taken pictures there. I am attaching an order of the German Army, which I appropriate and kept, issued by the divisional staff of the Parachute Division, commanded by General Kurt Student. I shall now describe the manner in which I was enabled to take the photo mentioned above.
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Jul
11
2009
Category : Airborne Operations, Archives Movies, Fallschirmjäger, German Airborne
Section 8
Reflection on the Absence of Russian Air Landings
It is surprising that during World War II the USSR did not attempt any large-scale airborne operations. Although Soviet Russia was the first country in the world which during peacetime had experimented with landing troops by air and had organized special units for this purpose*, its wartime operations were confined to the commitment of small units which were dropped back of the German front for the purpose of supporting partisan activities and which had no direct tactical or strategic effect. The reasons can only be surmised and might have been any or all of the following :
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Jul
11
2009
Section 4
Air Transported Troops
The original German plan to use Army troops for this purpose and to equip and train them accordingly was abandoned early in the war. The 22. Infanterie Division, which had been selected in peacetime for the purpose, participated in airborne operations only once, in Belgium and in Holland in 1940. It was found that their double equipment-one set for regular ground combat, the other for use in air-landing operations constituted an obstacle; consideration for their special mission limited their employment for ground combat. When a fresh commitment in line with their special mission became a possibility in Crete, it was found impossible to bring them up in time. On the other hand, as early as the Norway campaign, mountain troops were flown for commitment at Narvik without much prior preparation. While in this case non tactical transport by air was involved, the previously mentioned commitment in 1941 of the 5. Gebirgsjaeger Division in the airborne operation against Crete took place after only short preparation and was entirely successful.
On the basis of these experiences the idea of giving individual Army units special equipment for airborne operations was abandoned. The German High Command set about finding ways and means to adapt all Army units for transport by air with a minimum of changes in their equipment. The results were never put into practice because after Crete the Germans did not undertake any other airborne operations on a large scale. Crete, however, proved that the German mountain troops, because of their equipment and the training which they had received, as well as their combat methods, were particularly suited for missions of this nature. In the future the goal must be to find a way of committing not only mountain and infantry divisions but panzer and motorized formations in airborne operations. Their equipment and organization for this purpose will depend upon the evaluation of technical possibilities which cannot be discussed in detail here. The chief demand which the military must make upon the technical experts is that the changes required for such commitment be kept to a minimum. A way must be found to determine the best method for such a change so that the troops can undertake it promptly at any time.
Jul
10
2009
This study was written for the Historical Division, EUCOM, by a committee of former German officers. It follows an outline prepared by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Special Staff, United States Army, which is given below :
1-A) A review of German airborne experience in World War II
1-B) An appraisal of German successes and failures
1-C) Reasons for the apparent abandonment of large-scale German airborne operations after the Crete operation
2-A) German experience in opposing Allied and Russian airborne operations
2-B) An appraisal of the effectiveness of these operations
3-A) The probable future of airborne operations.
It is believed that the contributors to this study represent a valid cross-section of expert German opinion on airborne operations. Since the contributors include Luftwaffe and Army officers at various levels of command, some divergences of opinion are inevitable; these have been listed and, wherever possible, evaluated by the principal German author. However, the opinions of Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring are given separately and without comment wherever they occur in the course of the presentation. The reader is reminded that publications of the German Report Series were written by Germans and from the German point of view. Organization, equipment, and procedures of the German Army and Luftwaffe differ considerably from those of the United States armed forces.
This study is concerned only with the landing of airborne fighting forces in an area occupied or controlled by an enemy and with the subsequent tactical commitment of those forces in conventional ground combat. The employment of airborne units in commando operations, or in the supply and reinforcement of partisans and insurgents, is not included in this study, nor is the shifting of forces by troop-carrier aircraft in the rear of the combat zone. Such movements, which attained large size and great strategic importance during World War II, should not be confused with tactical airborne operations.
Feb
20
2009
Category : Kristallnacht, Shoah & Holocaust
The term Kristallnacht [Night of Broken Glass] refers to the organized anti-Jewish riots in Germany and Austria, on Nov 9 – Nov 10, 1938. These riots marked a major transition in Nazi policy, and were, in many ways, a harbinger of the Final Solution.
Nazi antisemitic policy began with the systematic legal, economic, and social disenfranchisement of the Jews. This was accomplished in various stages (e.g. The Nuremberg Laws of 1935, which, among other things, stripped German Jews of their citizenship). One of these steps involved the deportation of Polish Jews who were residing in Germany (est. 56.500).
On the night of Oct 27, 1938, 18000 Polish Jews were deported, but were initially refused entry into Poland by the Polish authorities. Caught in between, the Jews were forced to camp out in makeshift shelters. Upon hearing that his family was so trapped, 17 year-old Herschel Grynszpan, a student in Paris, shot the third secretary of the German Embassy, Ernst vom Rath, whom he mistook for the ambassador. This assassination served as a welcome pretext for the German initiation of Kristallnacht. Reinhard Heydrich (the head of the Reich Main Security Office which oversaw the Gestapo, police and SD operations) sent a secret telegram at 0120-H, Nov 10, 1938 to all headquarters and stations of the State Police; all districts and sub-districts of the SD. He gave instructions for the immediate coordination of police and political activities in inciting the riots throughout Germany and Austria.
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