Featured Posts

My WW-2 Posters Collection Part 5 (1201-1500) It was a crazy work bit I have spent almost 6 hours to convert this huge PDF file into Images (JPG) to allow anyone who would be interested to get some of the Posters (free of use). Should you want to...

Read more

My WW-2 Posters Collection Part 4 (0901-1200) It was a crazy work bit I have spent almost 6 hours to convert this huge PDF file into Images (JPG) to allow anyone who would be interested to get some of the Posters (free of use). Should you want to...

Read more

My WW-2 Posters Collection Part 3 (0601-0900) It was a crazy work bit I have spent almost 6 hours to convert this huge PDF file into Images (JPG) to allow anyone who would be interested to get some of the Posters (free of use). Should you want to...

Read more

Lt Ray F. Fletcher MIA 1944 is now back Home Airman Missing In Action From WW II Identified – 1st Lt. Ray F. Fletcher. More than 66 years after his plane went down, 1st Lt. Ray F. Fletcher is coming home and will be laid to rest on American soil...

Read more

Leading Life Insurance Consumer Information Site Life Insurance Quotes (http://www.lifeinsurancestar.com) is a leading life insurance consumer information site, if not one of the Best Lif​e Insura​nce Comp​anies​ online. We feature over 100...

Read more

twitter

Follow on Tweets

  •  

The Battle of the Bulge (3)

Category : Battle of the Bulge, The Bulge (CMH)

Chapter 3 – Troops and Terrain & The Order of the Battle

After-The-Battle-Of-The-Bulge-Belgium

During the long-drawn debate over the extent of the counteroffensive, the objective, and the attack form to be employed, the order of battle for Wacht am Rhein took form. This also led to differences of opinion and interpretation.
- How should the armies be aligned ?
- What forces, missions, and zones should be assigned to each particular army ?
- How many divisions, armored and infantry, would be available for use in the attack ?
The answers to these and like questions turned on the Solution adopted and the maneuver employed but will be set forth independently in an attempt to bring some order out of the confused interplay between Hitler, Jodl, Rundstedt, and Model.
Continue Reading >>>

The Battle of the Bulge (2)

Category : Battle of the Bulge, The Bulge (CMH)

CHAPTER II
Planning the Counteroffensive

Details of the Plan

About 25 September Generalorberst Alfred Jodl was ordered to begin a detailed analysis of the Hitlerian concept, the only function now left to the great General Staff. Some latitude remained to the individual staff officers and those favored few in the high echelon of command who retained access to the Führer in kneading and shaping the very general outline handed down by Hitler into an operations plan. The outline as it now had taken shape contained these major points :

  • (a) the attack should be launched sometime between 20 and 30 November;
  • (b) it should be made through the Ardenne in the Monschau – Echternach sector;
  • (c) the initial object would be the seizure of bridgeheads over the Meuse River between Liège and Namur;
  • (d) thereafter, Antwerp would be the objective;
  • (e) a battle to annihilate the British and Canadians would ultimately be fought north of the line Antwerp, Liège, Bastogne (1);
  • (f) a minimum of thirty divisions would be available, ten of which would be armored;
  • (g) support would be given by an unprecedented concentration of artillery and rocket projector units;
  • (h) operational control would be vested in four armies and two panzer armies abreast in the lead, two armies composed largely of infantry divisions to cover the flanks;
  • (i) the Luftwaffe would be prepared to support the operation;
  • (j) all planning would aim at securing tactical surprise and speed;(k) secrecy would be maintained at all costs and only a very limited number of individuals would be made privy to the plan.

map-001

Continue Reading >>>

German Airborne Operations (3)

Category : Airborne Operations, Archives Movies, Fallschirmjäger, German Airborne

BillLeeSection 8
Reflection on the Absence of Russian Air Landings

It is surprising that during World War II the USSR did not attempt any large-scale airborne operations. Although Soviet Russia was the first country in the world which during peacetime had experimented with landing troops by air and had organized special units for this purpose*, its wartime operations were confined to the commitment of small units which were dropped back of the German front for the purpose of supporting partisan activities and which had no direct tactical or strategic effect. The reasons can only be surmised and might have been any or all of the following :
Continue Reading >>>

Fallschirmjäger Operations WW-2 (2)

Category : Fallschirmjäger

Fallis-001Section 4
Air Transported Troops

The original German plan to use Army troops for this purpose and to equip and train them accordingly was abandoned early in the war. The 22. Infanterie Division, which had been selected in peacetime for the purpose, participated in airborne operations only once, in Belgium and in Holland in 1940. It was found that their double equipment-one set for regular ground combat, the other for use in air-landing operations constituted an obstacle; consideration for their special mission limited their employment for ground combat. When a fresh commitment in line with their special mission became a possibility in Crete, it was found impossible to bring them up in time. On the other hand, as early as the Norway campaign, mountain troops were flown for commitment at Narvik without much prior preparation. While in this case non tactical transport by air was involved, the previously mentioned commitment in 1941 of the 5. Gebirgsjaeger Division in the airborne operation against Crete took place after only short preparation and was entirely successful.
On the basis of these experiences the idea of giving individual Army units special equipment for airborne operations was abandoned. The German High Command set about finding ways and means to adapt all Army units for transport by air with a minimum of changes in their equipment. The results were never put into practice because after Crete the Germans did not undertake any other airborne operations on a large scale. Crete, however, proved that the German mountain troops, because of their equipment and the training which they had received, as well as their combat methods, were particularly suited for missions of this nature. In the future the goal must be to find a way of committing not only mountain and infantry divisions but panzer and motorized formations in airborne operations. Their equipment and organization for this purpose will depend upon the evaluation of technical possibilities which cannot be discussed in detail here. The chief demand which the military must make upon the technical experts is that the changes required for such commitment be kept to a minimum. A way must be found to determine the best method for such a change so that the troops can undertake it promptly at any time.

Continue Reading >>>

Anzio Beach Head (1)

Category : Anzio Beach Head, Italy

30-bmg-position-at-anzio-italyThe following study of German operations against the Allied beachhead at Anzio, from 22-01-44 to 31-05-44, is based on the available journals and records of the German X and XIV Armies. It should be noted that the facts and opinions expressed in the text reflect the German point of view, all statements on Allied troop strength, are German estimates. Records of the German Luftwaffe were not available, therefore the details of air action against the beachhead has not been included. The expressions like Panzer (tanks, armored), Jager (light infantry), and Panzer Grenadier (armored infantry), have been left in the German for purposes of clarification.
The daily reports list German and Allied losses. The Allied losses are limited to prisoners taken in most instances, and to weapons or materials known to have been destroyed. The German losses seem always to be minus at least one division, which means the German loss figures are probably grossly under-reported, for whatever reason. In addition, the German figures almost never reflect any material losses, so they do not show the number of tanks, trucks, airplanes, artillery pieces, etc., lost in the day-to-day fighting.
Continue Reading >>>