This study is a General Staff analysis and record of the most important operational details of the XIX Corps’ successful attack on and penetration through the Siegfried Line. This successful attack against the Siegfried Line should be treated largely as a tribute to the superb fighting ability of our infantry and armored soldiers, well supported by artillery and engineers, intelligently led in a well-planned action. It has demonstrated that thorough planning, determined leadership and aggressiveness in battle, can overcome what otherwise seems to be insuperable obstacles. Both, the 30th Infantry Division and the 2nd Armored Division were battle experienced with able leadership throughout their echelons. The 29th Infantry Division, which came in during the latter phases of the operation, was also a battle experienced Division. The 30-ID had been continually in contact with the enemy since its first attack on June 15 1944 on the Vire & Taute Canal (France); it had participated in the breakthrough south of St Lô; and had withstood the German Panzer attack near Mortain in their effort to recapture Avranches. It had fought across France and Belgium, capturing Tournai and Fort Eben Emael; and was the first American unit to enter Holland then entered Germany in September to prepare for this assault on the Siegfried Line. Its Commander, Maj Gen Leland S. Hobbs, had commanded the Division from its initial commitment; its Assistant Division Commander, Artillery Commander, and other higher commanders, were all experienced and battle tried. It was a well-developed team.
December 1944, Belgium, Context & Situation
Soldier’s which were involved in the massive German counterattack are the best witnesses to report about general front line situation during the period just before December 16 1944. It goes exactly in same way for the Battle of the Bulge.