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Desert Warfare, German Experiences in World War II, Ma Gen Alfred Toppe, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

Preface
Generalolberst Franz Halder

In spite of the time limit imposed on him, Maj Gen Alfred Toppe, the topic leader, with the collaboration of the leading German experts on the African campaign, has succeeded in this work in answering the assigned questions. The esprit de corps and the justified pride of the African veterans were a decided factor that helped to make the contributions so good and comprehensive that they could, to a large extent, be fitted into the attached study. This in no way detracts from the services of the topic leader. It was his initiative and organizational ability that resulted in this excellent study, despite the time restriction. The German experiences in African desert warfare are made unique by the fact that the command and the troops were faced with a mission in no way either planned or prepared, and they entered into it completely without prior prejudices. The experience gained, therefore, is free from outside theories and opinions and was only achieved by their struggling with an entirely new military situation; it thus has the value of originality. The value is diminished, however, by the fact that the experiences are in part negative and could not be developed further in a positive direction due to the lack of time and the limited means at hand. The particular conditions in Africa under which they were gained will have to be kept in mind in any evaluation. The impossibility of securing a supply line across a body of water dominated by the enemy, the numerical and material inadequacies held by the Germans ‘and even more their allies’ and the increasing lack of Luftwaffe fighting and transport units : these are all negative aspects of the campaign. On the positive side belongs the tempo and performance of field forces under the leadership of Rommel, forces which were without a doubt far above the average in initiative, spontaneity, and soldierly zeal.

Generaloberst Franz Halder
Koenigstein, Taunus
18 June 1952

INTRODUCTION

Two and a half months was the total time allotted for the preparation of this study. Prerequisite was that such German officers be induced to contribute who had had as broad as possible a view in the conduct of overall operations, who possessed practical combat experience, and, furthermore, who had exact knowledge of as many factors as possible that exerted a determining influence on desert warfare. In addition to the contributors listed below, a number of former members of the German Africa Corps also made contributions. The organization of this study was based on the individual questions assigned; German manuals were not used. The presentation, therefore, can be evaluated on the basis of actual experiences. A number of questions could not be answered exhaustively. The reason for this lies in the fact that no experience bad been gathered in such areas, or else operations took place in areas in which the typical attributes of a real desert were not present. The request attached to the major question that accounts by ‘individuals or groups’ be added concerning ‘Special Equipment and Procedures for Aircraft Crews’ could not be fulfilled because no authorities on this subject could be contacted in the short time available.

A board survey of important battles has been included in chapter II, section 7. The official documents contained in Field Marshal Rommel’s notes also have been utilized as a valuable source of information.
Those who have contributed information and analysis to this study include :

• Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein, Chief of Staff DAK, 41-42
• General der Flieger Paul Deichman, Chief of Staff Luftwaffe
• Oberst Helmut Hudel, Commanding 7 Panzer Rgt in Tunisia
• Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, Commanding in Chief, 42-43
• Regierungsbaurat, Dr Sigismund Kienow, Military Geologist, 41-43
• Generalmajor Gerhard Mueller, Commanding 5 Panzer Rgt, 42
• General der Kavallerie Siegfried Westphal
• Docktor Wilhelm Wagner, 21 Panzer Division, 41-42
• Hubert Ziessler, Artillery Regiment Commanding Officer, 41-43

I. PRIOR PLANNING
1. Intelligence Planning

a. Desert Terrain and Climate

When the first German units were shipped to Africa in February 1941, the officers responsible for the operational planning had no data of any kind on the nature of the terrain and circumstances in the desert. The intelligence data furnished by the Italians was extremely meager, and the Italian maps were so inaccurate and so incomplete that they were used only for lack of something better. For this reason, the German command had to obtain all necessary information itself through reconnaissance. In the papers found in his estate, Field Marshal Rommel wrote :

It has probably never happened before in modern warfare that an operation of this type was undertaken with so little preparation. On 11 February, I reported to General Garibaldi, the commander in chief of the Italian forces and informed him of my mission. Initially, he showed no enthusiasm for my plan to organize defense positions in the region of the Bay of Sirte as a first measure. Using the poor and inaccurate Italian map material, I then proceeded to explain to General Garibaldi my ideas as to approximately how the war in Tripolitania should be conducted.
Garibaldi, who was unable to give me any precise information about the terrain that would be involved, advised me to reconnoiter the terrain between Tripoli and the Bay of Sirte personally, and said that I could not possibly have any idea of the enormous difficulties this theater of war presented.
Around midday I took off aboard a Type He 111 plane to reconnoiter the combat area. We saw the field-type fortifications and the deep attack antitank ditch east of Tripoli and then flew over a wide belt of dunes which presented a good natural barrier before the fortifications of Tripoli and would prove difficult to cross with wheeled or track vehicles. Then we flew across the mountainous country between Taruna and Horns, which appeared hardly suitable for operations by armored units in contrast to the patches of level terrain between Horns and Misurate.
Like a black band the Via Balbia road could be seen extending through the desolate country, in which no tree or shrub was visible as far as the eye could reach. We passed over Buerat, a small desert fort on the coast with barracks and a landing stage, and finally circled above the white houses of Sirte.
Southeast and south of this locality we saw Italian troops in their positions. With the exception of the salty swamps between Buerat and Sirte, which extended only a few kilometers southward, we found no features in any sector that would favor a defense, such as, for instance, a deep valley. This reconnaissance flight supported me in my plan to fortify Sirte and the terrain on either side of the coastal road and to concentrate the mobile units for mobile operations within the area of the defense sector in order to counterattack as soon as the enemy started an enveloping attack.

From the above, it will be seen that Rommel himself had to gather the information on the terrain and on the peculiarities of the desert that he required for the conduct of operations. It was only during a later stage that the so-called military geographical description was made available to the Germans, which gave a general survey of the terrain but was based mainly on information gleaned from literary works and contained none of the detailed information required by the troops. This data was of only small military value. The military geological unit attached to the German Africa Corps commenced a systematic assembling of data and methodical reconnoitering immediately after arrival. The English maps captured by the German troops proved an excellent help. The results of the methodical reconnaissance were consolidated in what might be called a traversability map and in reports, and these were made available to the command.

These maps contained the following details :

• Terrain that could be traversed by any type of vehicle in all parts and in all directions.
• Terrain outside the Pistes (Tracks) that was moderately or poorly suited for vehicular traffic.
• Terrain with many steep cliffs.
• Salty swamps and depressions that were impassable after rain.
• Sand dunes that were difficult for vehicular traffic.
• Information on plant growth.
• Broken terrain.
• Impassable cliffs.
• Cliffs that were leas steep and that could be traversed in numerous places.
• Passes over the cliffs, with information as to whether they could be used by wheeled or only track laying vehicles.
• Trails, with information as to their usability for wheeled or track laying vehicles.

The military geological unit compiling these maps consisted of two geologists and ten auxiliaries. However, they were inadequately equipped so that it was only possible to reconnoiter the areas that happened to be tactically important at any given time. Occasional inaccuracies and deviations in the lines marking the limits of the traversable terrain on the maps were unavoidable.

Here, a word might be said about the work of the British Long Range Desert Group that, apart from its intelligence and sabotage missions, carried out reconnaissance far behind the Italo-German fronts in Libya. The results obtained in this reconnaissance work formed the basis for the British maps on the Italian colony of Libya, which were incomparably better, so far as quality, accuracy, and detail were concerned, than the Italian maps.
The British maps were considered a particularly valuable prize when captured.

b. Scope of the Evaluation

The above serves to show that in deserts, the command must employ adequate personnel with adequate equipment organized in specialized units if it wishes to obtain usable maps within a brief space of time.
After the winter of 1941, the traversability maps served as permanent data for the German command. The preparations for attacks and for defense positions were based on them.

c. Influence of Intelligence on Planning

The available intelligence information was so inadequate in the spring of 1941 that it influenced in no way the employment of the German forces. As previously stated, Field Marshal Rommel had to gather the necessary information on the terrain and on the characteristics of the desert. On the basis of this information, he performed his mission of halting the British advance and preventing the loss of the whole of Libya.

d. Availability and Evaluation of Terrain Intelligence

The pamphlets Military Geographical Descriptions for Libya, Northeast Africa, and Egypt were published by the Military-Geographical Branch of the German Army High Command. Since they contained only information on cities, roads, oases, (Some of these maps are found in Toppe’s original, complete manuscript) and a general survey of the entire region, they could serve the command only as a source of general orientation, for which purpose they proved valuable. They contained very few important tactical details. They were put out in such large numbers that they could be made available down to regimental staff level. At these lower levels, their value was naturally restricted.

e. Use of Historical Data for Planning Purposes

With the exception of the experience gained by General Graziani’s army during its advance on Egypt in the winter of 1940, no information taken from military history was used in planning the campaign. One lesson that this experience pointed out is that troops that are not motorized are valueless in desert warfare and can do nothing whatever against a motorized enemy. General Graziani’s army consisted almost exclusively of infantry units, and it was tied down, enveloped, and destroyed by the well-motorized British forces because it was unable to conduct mobile operations. The African Campaign took on such entirely new forms owing to the almost exclusive use of mobile troops by both sides in the desert. It was not possible in planning to make use of any examples taken from military history. Indeed, the methods of modern desert warfare were created by Field Marshal Rommel.

2. Operational Planning

a. General

Prior to World War II, not a soul in the German armed forces imagined the possibility of it becoming necessary in any future war to conduct land warfare outside of Europe. This is why no particular attention was paid in the army to the military experiences of this type gained during World War I, particularly in the former German colony, German East Africa. It was only in 1935 that a subsection for colonial affairs was created in the Foreign Affairs Branch of the Reich Ministry of War. This subsection was staffed with only one officer who had fought in German Southwest Africa. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1939, no preparations of any sort had been made in the German Army for any desert warfare that might possibly become necessary in the future. All preparatory work in the operational, organizational and training fields had been restricted exclusively to preparations for the conduct of war on the continent of Europe. This was why a suggestion submitted by the Mapping and Survey Branch of the German Army General Staff in 1938 that the maps to be issued in the eventuality of mobilization should include maps of :

• Denmark
• Norway
• North Africa

was disapproved as entirely unnecessary by the appropriate representative of the Operational Branch under instructions from the chief of that branch. It is an actual fact that early in 1941, the German troops reached the African theater of operations almost entirely unprepared for their new missions. Up to the summer of 1940, the information available to the German Army General Staff on North Africa was restricted to the reports furnished by the German military attaché in Rome and reports from agents of the German counterintelligence service. From the autumn of 1940 on, Special Detachment Dora, a detachment of the German counterintelligence branch, was in Libya. Its main mission was to keep the French territories in Africa under observation. Most of the data on which the German military attaché in Rome based his reports came from his liaison officer attached to the governor general, who was simultaneously commander in chief of all forces in Italian North Africa, and on personal impressions gained while traveling. All positive information of a military nature on North Africa was taken from the manuals of the Foreign Armies Intelligence Branch (West) on the British, French, and Italian armed forces.

Originally, Hitler had decided to leave Italian dictator Benito Mussolini an entirely free hand in conducting operations in the Mediterranean theater, which was another reason for the small interest of the German General Staff in this subject. A change in this fundamental view of Hitler only took place in the summer of 1940, when it became evident, on the one hand, that Italy was apparently avoiding any decisive action in the Mediterranean theater, while the British, on the other hand, were continually reinforcing their troops in Egypt without their transportation being appreciably affected by the Italian Navy. At the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini in October 1940, the dispatch of a German Panzer Corps to Libya was discussed, but no decision was reached. Following the discussion, a general of the armored force who was attached to the German Army High Command was sent to Italian North Africa for an on the spot study of the possibilities of employing a German expeditionary corps there. Shortly after this, Italy rejected the support offered by Germany; quite obviously, Mussolini did not want any German military support in North Africa.

The 3. Panzer Division, which in peacetime was garrisoned in the Berlin area, had been reorganized in all haste for employment in the tropics as a precautionary measure; it was now available for other employment. Later, when the British offensive, which gained huge initial successes, threatened to develop into a catastrophe for the Italian forces, Italy requested the dispatch of German forces to Libya. The first unit to be transferred was the X Air Corps, which was sent to Sicily. So far as ground forces were concerned, the original plan was to send only a defense unit of brigade strength that was to be specially organized for the purpose, but it soon became evident that such a weak unit would not be able to give Germany’s ally any really effective support.

In January 1941, Hitler therefore decided to make a special corps of two divisions available – the German Africa Corps. Meanwhile, a special staff for tropical warfare (Sonderstab Trupen) had been formed at the headquarters of the commander of the Replacement Training Army in Berlin. It was composed of officers who had fought in the German colonies in World War I and was to assemble as speedily as possible all experience that could be helpful in the training, organization, equipment, and employment of troops in desert warfare. However, the march of events was too fast so that the first units of the German Africa Corps landed in Africa when the staff had just commenced its work in Libya. What has been said above goes to show that the German Army High Command was taken almost completely by surprise when the necessity arose to dispatch troops for warfare in the desert. In any event, the command had no time to make thorough preparations for this type of combat employment. For this reason, all preparatory work that was possible in the short space of time available had to be restricted mainly to the following measures :

• (1) Medical examinations of all troops to determine their fitness for service in the tropics, with the application of very severe standards.
• (2) Equipment of all soldiers with tropical clothing.
• (3) Adaptation of a training program for combat in open terrain.
• (4) Camouflage of all vehicles with a coat of desert-colored paint.
• (5) Organization of special units to handle water-supply problems.
• (6) Familiarization of the troops with the hygienic measures necessary in tropical climates.
• (7) Orientation of the troops on the military-geographical conditions of the new theater of war and on the peculiarities of Germany’s allies and enemies.

In this respect, it must be mentioned that initially only one military geographical bulletin was available. It had been prepared in a hurry and was not accurate in all points.
A manual of instructions for the tropics was being drafted in the summer of 1942. It was not possible within Germany to accustom the troops to the intense heat to which they would be exposed, particularly at that time of the year, the winter of 1940. To a certain extent, the troops that had to wait any length of time in Italy for transportation to North Africa adapted themselves automatically to the heat.

b. Changes in Troop Organization and Equipment

The composition of the units employed in Africa was the same as those in Europe. The pressure of time alone made any reorganization impossible in 1941, and later experience showed that no specialized organization is necessary for divisions and other units that are to be employed in desert warfare. However, it is necessary to have a far higher ratio of tanks and antitank weapons, since these are the two decisive weapons in the desert. It goes without saying that all units employed in desert warfare must be motorized. The following special units were newly activated for employment in the desert :

• (1) Water-supply companies, under the command of engineer officers. They were assigned to the corps and operated under the Water-Supply Branch of the corps supply and administration officer. These companies had pumps and equipment for the drilling of deep wells, while some of them had installations for the distillation of water.
• (2) Water-supply transportation columns that were organized in the same way as ordinary supply-transportation columns but were employed solely in the transportation of water to the troops. They had no tank trucks or tank trailers as was customary with the British units but had to transport water in twenty liter cans. This method of transportation proved extremely tiresome, quite apart from the considerable loading space required, which imposed an extra strain on the gas-supply services.
• (3) Astronomical observation teams, directed by professional astronomers who were awarded regular or assimilated officer rank. These teams worked under the special staff officer for surveying attached to the operations officer of the army, and their function was to establish geographical points by astronomical means. They were rarely employed, since no serious orientation difficulties arose because most of the fighting took place in the region and not in the desert proper.

The following changes proved necessary so far as equipment was concerned :

• long-range artillery
• long-range antitank guns
• tank guns

decisively influence the course of battle in desert warfare, and it was therefore necessary to employ were long range weapons. No alterations of the weapons themselves were necessary. In their 87.6-MM guns, the British had a light artillery piece with a longer range than the Germans’ guns, but the German forces in Africa soon received 100-MM and 170-MM guns that had a longer range than any of the British guns.

In 1941, the guns of the German Type III tanks had a longer range than the guns of the British tanks, and this was the reason for the success of the German tanks in that year, but from May 1942 on, the British employed American tanks of the Grant, Lee, and Sherman types that mounted guns with a considerably superior range of fire. In the Battle of Gazala, these guns came as a disconcerting surprise for the German tank units, and in the first phase of the battle, the British were able to gain considerable successes.

Clothing and uniforms were entirely different from the clothing and uniforms worn in Europe. The German army uniform was made from a watertight linen, cut in a style approximating the traditional uniforms of the former German colonial defense forces. These uniforms proved unsuitable both in style and material. The material was too stiff and did not’ give adequate protection against heat or cold. In the early mornings, the material absorbed moisture from the dew so that it became intolerable to wear the uniforms. The British tropical uniforms, in contrast, were made of pure wool and were excellent. Large quantities of the British uniforms were captured and worn by the troops of the German Africa Corps (with the addition of German insignias). The Germans especially liked the British trousers. The tropical uniforms of the German Air Force, however, were good. Their color, a yellowish-brown, was more appropriate than other German uniforms, and they were made from a material that was of a lighter and better quality which was cut in a more appropriate style. Uniforms of olive-drab color proved unfavorable.

In view of the normal camouflage difficulties in the desert, a yellowish-brown, which would have been a protective color, would have been best. High boats were unsuitable in every respect, since in hot climates, everything must be done to prevent soldiers wearing any apparel on the legs that restricts the circulation of the blood. In this matter, the troops helped themselves by wearing only slacks, most of which came from captured British depots and which the troops wore over their boats. The German shoe with laces and a cloth tongue proved suitable. The shorts issued to the troops could not be worn during combat, since they left bare legs exposed to injury by thorns and stones, and these injuries healed very slowly. The olive-drab caps with wide visors were excellent; the visor, in particular, was indispensable for the infantryman and for the gunner as protection against the intense glare of the sun. The tropical helmets that were issued could be used only in the rear areas and were entirely useless in combat. The German troops wore no steel helmets, in contrast to the British troops, whose steel helmets were more appropriate both in shape and weight, being lighter than the German helmets. The tropical coats issued, which were made from a thick woolen material, were good, but the English ones, which were fur-lined and reached only to the knees, were better.

Owing to the stiff material from which it was made, the German tropical shirts were inferior to the British ones, which were made of so-called ‘Tropic’ material. To protect the abdominal area of the body against the cold, the wearing of belly bands was obligatory, which proved a wise measure. Tropical helmets and mosquito nets proved an unnecessary expenditure. The majority of the troops got rid of them immediately after debarking from the ships, since they were not able to take them along owing to insufficient transportation space.

The troops were also furnished wall tents, which had a special sun apron. With the exception of footwear, no leather was used in any article of apparel; it was replaced everywhere by thick linen. The types of vehicles used were the same as those used in Europe. Vehicles with diesel engines were not used to avoid the necessity of transporting two different types of fuel. However, experience showed that it would have been advisable to accept this disadvantage in order to facilitate transportation, since fuel oil could have been transported in bulk containers, such as tank trailers. The excellent coastal road would have allowed the use of such transportation. Volkswagens were used in great numbers and proved excellent. Far use under desert conditions, the following alterations were made to adapt the standard model : air intakes were placed inside the vehicles to reduce the amount of dust taken in by the motor in place of the standard tires, aircraft over-sized tires were used, which proved exceptionally good on rocky terrain and in sandy stretches. Because of their low air pressure, such tires reduced the shocks on rocky ground while on sandy tracks, the wide treads of the tires prevented the vehicles from sinking into the sand and getting stuck. On the whole, however, the British motor vehicles, as a result of the extensive experience of the British in desert conditions, were superior to those of the Germans, being better adapted to the special conditions in respect to tires, power, higher ground clearance, and lower bodies. Double tires proved unsuitable, particularly in areas where the surface was covered with stones, as the stones became compressed in large quantities in the spaces between the tires.

In the desert, motor vehicles must always carry something or other, such as rope ladders or grids, for the men to place underneath the wheels if they get stuck in the sand. To reduce the effects of sand and heat, additional air filters for all types of vehicles were developed and used. They proved very valuable, although it was not possible to eliminate the effects of sand on the motors altogether.
Troops employed under desert conditions should be furnished a certain number of aircraft compasses, which should be mounted on the windshield next to the driver’s seat. By means of a small magnet, deviations were excluded so that the driver was able to drive in the direction ordered. The sun compasses, which were developed for the same purpose, did not meet requirements, since they were too complicated and failed to function properly around midday, between 1000 and 1400. Pocket compasses were indispensable and had to be issued to each man individually, since the individual soldier plays a greater role in the desert than in any other theater of operations.
The compasses used by the British, in which the dials floated on oil, were better than the German ones and were preferred by the German troops when they managed to capture any. The Germans failed to develop anything special as a protection against flies and other insects, which became particularly pestiferous in summer. Insecticides similar to FLIT were an urgent requirement for the combat units.

6. Special Training

It was not possible to give the troops, which were rushed to Africa suddenly and at short notice, any specialized training. All that was done was to have them attend a number of lectures by specialists in tropical medicine and by officers who had a vague knowledge of conditions from previous travels. However, these lectures gave the troops wrong impressions of what they were to expect from the effects of heat, sand, insects, and diseases-instead of orienting them properly. The instructions on hygiene in the tropics, on the other hand, were good. Even units that were transferred to Africa during the further course of the campaign there received no real specialized training because the orders for their transfer usually came so unexpectedly that there was no time for this purpose. However, in a suggestion submitted to the German Army High Command by the army in Africa, the following training subjects were considered important :

• (1) Exercises of all types in marching and combat in open, sandy terrain.
• (2) Cover and camouflage in open terrain.
• (3) Aiming and firing of all weapons in open terrain and at extremely long ranges.
• (4) Recognition and designation of targets without instruments. The aiming and firing exercises were to be carried out by daylight, at night, in the glaring sun, during twilight, facing the sun, with the back to the sun, with the sun shining from one side, by moonlight, and with artificial lighting.
• (5) Exercises during extreme heat.
• (6) Exercises of long duration with no billeting accommodations.
• (7) The construction of shelters in sandy terrain.
• (8) Practice in night driving and in driving over sandy terrain.
• (9) Night marching in level terrain.
• (10) Orientation by compass, by the stars, and so forth.
• (11) Driving by march compass.
• (12) Recovery of tanks and other vehicles in sandy terrain.
• (13) Laying and removing of mines in sandy terrain.
• (14) Exercises in mobile warfare.

If it had been possible to train the troops in these subjects and to prepare them thoroughly, considerable losses could probably have been averted.

d. Acclimatization of the Troops

So far as the first divisions transferred to Africa were concerned, no measures were taken to accustom the troops to excessive heat. Some of the replacements sent forward later had the opportunity of spending a certain period in southern Italy or in the Balkans for acclimatization. The climate in these two regions is very similar to the climate in the coastal areas of North Africa. In the light of experience, however, a familiarization period is not considered absolutely essential, since the troops employed without a prior period of acclimatization proved no less efficient in combat than those who had lived for a time in southern Italy or in the Balkans. It was not the climate alone that caused the heavy losses that were suffered but the poor food, the hardships during combat, combined with the effects of the climate; the troops had in no way been prepared for these circumstances. It proved very unwise to transfer units or replacements to the desert in summer, during the hottest part of the year and the time when the flies proved most troublesome. A parachute brigade provides a typical example. The brigade was transferred from Europe in July 1942, the hottest time of the year, and employed in defense in the rocky wilderness around El Alamein. The unit consisted of handpicked men, and within a very short while, more than 50 percent of them were sick from the combined effects of the heat, with its accompanying discomforts, and the inadequate diet. Shortly after the unit was committed, numerous cases of metabolic disorders set in, such as dysentery, jaundice, and festering sores that healed only very slowly. The causes were the brackish drinking water, which contained as much as one gram of salt per liter, and the inadequate diet, which consisted almost exclusively of canned foods. Blond and redheaded men with blue eyes and fair skins were particularly susceptible, while the brown and dark-haired types soon recovered from the disorders that were almost inevitable in the beginning.

These points were not taken into account in earlier medical examinations the main emphasis being placed on sound teeth and a strong heart. The result was that the elite units, such as the paratroopers, suffered particularly heavy losses. Even prior acclimatization would not have protected them.

The following experience was gained in respect to the acclimatization of persons to hot climates : men who had lived before in temperate zones stood the intense heat very well in the first year, during which they were far more efficient than the indigenous population and Europeans who had been living in the country for a long time. This proved to be the case when German troops were employed in Sicily, for instance, where summer temperatures are the same as those in the deserts of Africa. In the average case, however, the powers of resistance of the new arrivals declined after the first year, and their efficiency sank below the level of that of persons who had spent a longer time in the country. The newcomers’ efficiency only started to improve gradually after a few years but never reached the same standard as that they experienced the first year. The following inferences can be drawn from this experience :

• (1) No prior, lengthy acclimatization should take place for troops, since this would waste part of their first year of maximum efficiency.
• (2) Only a brief transitional period should be allowed in a hot climate, during which the troops can be instructed in the manner of living under tropical and desert conditions and the best protective measures they should take without the added difficulty of enemy action.
• (3) After approximately one year on active service in a hot climate, the troops should be rotated to some other theater of operations. The disadvantage that the experience gained by the men can only be exploited for a relatively short time must be accepted.

e. Development of Special Equipment

The following special types of equipment were developed :

• (1) Special tropical clothing and uniforms.
• (2) Special air filters for motor vehicles, including tanks.
• (3) Special medical equipment for use in tropical climates.

3. Logistical Planning

Logistical planning is an integral part of operational planning. In this operation, plans for the supply services also had to be prepared at top speed. The main concern in these plans was to provide transportation of supplies for the German troops by rail to Italian ports and by German or Italian ships to ports in North Africa. The selection of transportation media and supervision of the loading was the responsibility of a special branch, the Branch for Transportation to Africa. It operated under the command of the German military attaché in Rome. Unloading in African ports and further transportation of supplies to the troops was the responsibility of the supply and administration officer of the Africa Corps, later of the chief supply and administration officer of the Panzergruppe Afrika, which later again was re-designated the Panzer Army of Africa and finally the German-Italian Panzer Army.
Initially, all bulk commodities, as well as all troops, were transported by sea, but when shipping losses mounted, personnel were transported by plane.

In November 1941, Field Marshal Kesselring arrived in Italy as commander of the Second Air Force. In coordinated action with the Italian Navy and Air Force, his mission was to protect Germans and to prevent British transportation in the Mediterranean. It is said that shortly after his arrival, he sighed :

Now it is clear to me that in conducting a war across the sea, the proper delivery of the means of combat at their proper place is of far more importance than any worries as to whether the enemy should be attacked on the right or left flank.

It was not possible with the means available to the supply command or with any improvised measures to secure adequate supply services for the armored forces in Africa. To keep open the supply lanes or to open these lanes was the responsibility of the operational command, which rested with the Italian Supreme Command. The Wehrmacht High Command had supported the Italian Supreme Command but had also occasionally interfered in the conduct of operations. It was imperative that this problem be solved if an adequate supply service was to be secured for the troops in Africa. As no solution was found, the supply service collapsed as a natural consequence after all improvised means had failed. The following dates and information concerning the functioning of the supply services has been furnished by the German general attached to the Italian Supreme Command during the period from February 1941 to May 1943.

a. February-May 1941

The transportation of troops and supplies across the Mediterranean functioned without interruption. The convoys reached Tripoli regularly and almost without losses. Immediately after its capture, Benghasi was used as a port of debarkation. At the request of the German command, Italian submarines were used as early as April 1941 to transport fuel for the most advanced elements of the Africa Corps. They discharged their cargo at Derna. Coastal shipping along the African coast was organized with small ships and sailing boats with auxiliary motors.

b. June-December 1941

British surface and submarine craft interfered with the transportation of German troops and supplies. The losses in shipping space and in material were considerable. To relieve the situation, air transportation groups were employed to move troops and material, while naval barges transported tanks and important spare parts. The use of Bardia as a port of debarkation close to the front was prevented by the British Air Force. In December, Italian battleships had to be used to protect the convoys.

c. January-June 1942

During this period, transportation was favored by German superiority in the air, which was gained by the German Second Air Force under Kesselring and also by the fact that Malta was suppressed. The transportation of troops and supplies functioned smoothly and with few losses. Enough supplies were moved forward to enable the German-Italian Army to launch an offensive with limited objectives that advanced as far as the borders of Egypt in May-June. In addition, adequate supplies were stockpiled for a period of six to eight weeks against the eventuality of the air forces and naval vessels being employed in an operation to capture Malta.

d. July 1942-May 1943

As a result of Rommel’s advance into Egyptian territory after the capture of Tobruk (this advance was contrary to the plans of the Italian Supreme Command), the supplies deposited in the Benghasi and Tripoli areas for the front were practically useless, since the distances were too great for transportation of supplies on land and coastal shipping was prevented by the British. The German Second Air Force was compelled to transfer some of its units stationed in Sicily and southern Italy to Africa and Greece to support the Panzer Army of Africa, which was fighting desperately at El Alamein. As a result, the Luftwaffe was so heavily engaged that it was unable even to screen Malta. The British forces on Malta regained their strength and employed new types of bombers that were equipped with radar and had a wider radius of action. The British succeeded in bringing German convoy traffic to an almost complete standstill. The Italian battleships were in port at Tarent and La Spezia, unable to operate because of lack of fuel. Losses in material and fuel were so heavy that it was barely possible to obtain adequate supplies from Germany. The sea routes to Tripoli and Benghasi were completely severed. Air transportation from Crete now played the major role, but quite naturally, the volume was far too small to meet even the most urgent demands of the front. In addition, the Wehrmacht High Command moved an infantry division from Crete to Egypt. This division had no motorized vehicles whatever so that it became an added strain on the transportation and supply services in Africa. After the occupation of Tunis, the distances across the sea were admittedly shorter. Nevertheless, in spite of the use of the military transport ships, which had been constructed meanwhile, and numerous ships of the smallest types, it was not possible to relieve the strained supply situation.

Anglo-American power in the air was growing steadily, and transportation capacities were sinking from day to day. Even a temporary increase of the quantities transported by air to 1,000 tons failed to bring any relief. Once the German-Italian forces in Tunis were enveloped, the Anglo-American fighter planes had such complete mastery in the air, even over the Straits of Sicily, that it was hardly possible for even the smallest ships to reach Africa safely.
Around 20 April, the German-Italian air transportation units were subjected to a crippling attack. Thus, the point must be brought out that as a result of the gradually developing Anglo-American supremacy at sea and in the air in the Mediterranean, North Africa was cut off from Europe. The German-Italian forces operating in Africa, therefore, could not be adequately reinforced or supplied. This lack of any possibility of maintaining supply traffic was not due to any failure an the part of the German or Italian headquarters responsible for the movement of supplies but solely to the fact that the German-Italian operational command did not succeed in keeping the supply routes to Africa open. Any examination of the question why these routes were not kept open or could not be kept open is beyond the scope of this study.

Plans for supplying the troops in the desert had provided for adequate supply transportation space and also an additional water-supply service. Each division had the same transportation space; the same motor vehicle and weapons-maintenance units; and the administrative, medical, and military police units as a division in Europe – plus a water distilling company. The corps supply services included an additional, special water-supply company and filter and distilling units and geological teams.

II – OPERATIONS

4. General Description of the Zone of Operations

The zone of operations in the North African campaign in Libya and Egypt consisted of a strip of land, sometimes as much as sixty kilometers wide, bounded on one side by the coast and on the other by the desert interior. The ground surface was either firm gravel, sand-covered gravel, or mixed sand and gravel. Within this entire zone, large parts of which were level plain, the desert could be traversed by all types of vehicles. The only exceptions were patches of deep sand and steep wadis-which could not always be ascertained from the map-and salty swamps, such as those at Marada, roughly forty kilometers south of Marsa el Brega. Natural sinuous defiles were formed at Derna and the Halfaya Pass at the border between Libya and Egypt. It was also possible to create defiles by the use of mines. Undulating, steppe-like terrain predominated, which consisted of low mounds and long ridges, whose average height above the surrounding terrain was from four to twenty meters. At times, these ridges had gentle slopes, and at other times, they rose steeply from broad, level valleys in which there were no watercourses. The summits were naked rock covered with loose rocks of varying size, which made motor traffic difficult but not impossible. In the valleys, the rocky bottom was covered by a layer of dust or clay of varying thickness. In dry weather, this ground could be traversed without difficulty by vehicles with four-wheel drive that were capable of cross-country travel-but not without raising dense clouds of dust. The steppe-like terrain had patches of camel’s thorn shrubs, around which the dust had blown to form small dunes. Traffic followed the broad paths, called Trighs or Pistes, which connected the few settlements and water holes. This terrain extended from the coast to a line roughly thirty or forty kilometers inland. The coast itself was fringed by a belt of dunes behind which was a zone of salt swamps, called Sebchen, which were usually dry. This coastal zone was frequently used as a bivouac area for troops, since it offered good opportunities for digging in tents and vehicles and had good water-supply facilities. The only parts of the coast where there were no dunes were the cliff sections at Tobruk, Bardia, and Sollum.
There, the coastal sector was often intersected by deep wadis and was difficult to penetrate. Toward the interior, the steppe-like zone gradually merged with the desert proper, which is practically devoid of any type of vegetation. On the whole, motoring was easier in the desert proper than in the steppe-like zone, although movement was rendered difficult in rugged areas. In the desert, instead of rocky surfaces, patches with a deep covering of sand were encountered that made rapid travel possible. Here, the valley floors were clay pans, as flat as tabletops, which were submerged in water during the rainy periods. Only at the foot of steep cliffs was a rocky bottom found or a soft, sandy bottom, where vehicles might easily sink. This soft sand also covered the beds of the numerous wadis, by which the steep faces of the ridges are broken so that it was often extremely difficult to surmount the obstacles presented, even by comparatively low, steep ridges.

Farther south, these patches of soft sand increased in size and seriously impeded operations by armored units. The dividing line between those parts of the desert in which mobility was good and those in which it was bad is in eastern Libya and western Egypt, between the 29th and 30th degrees latitude. South of the 29th degree latitude, the vast dune-covered expanses began, and to cross them was considered quite a sporting feat. We can thus see that the area suitable for military operations was confined to the relatively narrow strip along the coast and the southern desert zone, which was more favorable for rapid movement on the whole than the northern, steppe-like zone (if the tarred coastal road is left out of consideration).
Within the zone described, the following types of terrain obstacles were to be found :

a. Mountain Ranges

Three mountain ranges played an important part in the war in Africa, namely :

• (1) The Cyrenaica Mountains.
  At points, these mountains reach a height of 875 meters above sea level and intercept the moisture carried inland by the north wind. The heavier rainfall here is the reason why the chalky ground carries a growth of macchia in contrast to the desert or steppe-like areas.
  The mountains rise in two, high, steep terraces that can be traversed at only a few points and are intersected by numerous deep valleys, which make it impossible to conduct sizable operations except along roads, South of the topmost ridges, the mountains slope down gradually to the desert terrain, which is good for vehicular traffic. For this reason, the Cyrenaica region was vulnerable to attack from the south : a fact that Rommel recognized at once during his attack in the spring of 1941.
  For this reason, he delivered his main attack against Meehili, a desert fort designed to protect the southern approaches to the Cyrenaica.
  The fact that it was so easy to bypass is the reason why the Cyrenaica was never held with any degree of determination by either side during the entire campaign, although it could be called a natural fortress. During every retreat, every effort was made to pass through this region as rapidly as possible to avoid being intercepted.
• (2) The Gebel Nefusa Mountains.
  These mountains protruded like a barrier between the coastal plains of Tripoli and those of Misurata.
  South of Tripoli, they rose to a height of 700 meters above sea level, the first 300 meters of which were a gigantic cliff.
  In the southeast, they descended in a gradual slope. At Horns, in the northeast toward the sea, their height was less than 200 meters above sea level. In the central part, this mountain range was extremely rugged, and motorized troops could onIy pass along the roads. The southeast slope was covered with a deep layer of wind-blown sandy loess that made vehicular traffic difficult. From the north, this mountain range formed an impregnable fortress.
  From the southeast, however, it was vulnerable to attack in spite of the mountainous and intersected nature of its approaches, since the attacking forces could find favorable assembly areas in the foothills and could approach under cover to the proximity of defense positions.
  Possibilities for bypassing the area existed and were taken advantage of by the British in the attack in January 1943.
• (3) The Matmata Mountains.
  These mountains, a range in south Tunisia, had a steep drop of 100 to 200 meters in the east. In the west, they sloped down gradually to a high plateau, which was sandy in parts, while in other areas, the ground was good for motor traffic so that it could be crossed by motorized columns in spite of occasional difficulties. The steep, clifflike wall in the east and north was interrupted by numerous wadis, through some of which an ascent to the high plateau was possible. The Matmata Mountains narrowed down the size of the coastal plains of southern Tunisia considerably so that it was possible to organize a defense line at the narrowest point, at Mareth. However, the steep mountainside was only a weak protection against flanking attacks, since it could be bypassed with little difficulty. Only if the German-Italian forces had been numerous enough to hold all passes and if they had had a mobile reserve available to repulse any enemy attempts at detouring the mountains would this range have constituted an important factor in the defense.

b. Steep Terraces

Most of the steep terraces in the steppe-like terrain were not high and followed a course parallel with the coast. Thus, they hardly interfered with troop movements. In the numerous caves, overhanging cliffs, and gorges, good opportunities could be found for troop shelters, for which purpose they were frequently used, since they were the most effective protection against air attacks that was to be found. Some of the steep terraces and other similar terrain features, however, became of outstanding importance, namely :

• (1) The Northern Rim of the Qattara Depression, on Which the Southern Flank of the El Alamein Line Was Based. This rim towered about 300 meters above the floor of the depression, which was 80 meters below sea level. Within the sectors held by the German-Italian forces, there were only three points at which motor traffic was possible, and even there, difficulties were encountered because of the deep sand. Throughout the entire campaign, no better protection for a flank was ever found than in the El Alamein line.
• (2) The Steep Terrace at Sollurn between the Bardia-Capuzzo High Plateau and the Sollum Coastal Plain. There were two roads with numerous serpentine curves across the terrace, one from the Via Balbia – the tarred coastal road-the other from the Halfaya Pass road. During the period of positional warfare in the summer of 1941, the terrace was within the combat area.
• (3) Large-Size Wadis.
  These were found in the Cyrenaica region and in the eastern approaches to the Tripolitanian Mountain and extended as far as the Bay of Sirte. Usually the bed of a wadi consisted of a layer of soft sand; less frequently, the beds were salty swamps with a growth of camel’s thorn. The banks were usually steep but not continuous, since they were cut by numerous intersecting wadis. On the whole, wadis could be considered as terrain obstacles but as obstacles that could be overcome without difficulty unless obstinately defended. During the German-Italian retreat from El Alamein to Tunis, only one defense position was based on a wadi, namely the Buerat line, which extended along the Zem-Zem wadi south of the Via Balbia. After careful deliberation, however, the line was developed east of the wadi to prevent an approach by the enemy under cover and not on the low-lying west bank, since the west bank was dominated by the higher opposite bank. The Buerat line could be bypassed easily. It was therefore evacuated by the infantry before the attack began and held only for a short while in a delaying action by mobile units.
• (4) Dune Terrain
  Large sandy areas were found close to the coast, near larger wadis, and in the desert proper, where the ergs (large areas of shifting sand dunes) present barriers that were impenetrable for traffic. Big dunes along the coast that interfered with traffic were found around Agedabia, on the shores of the Bay of Sirte south of Misurata, and in the neighborhood of Tripoli, thus mostly in western Libya. These dunes seriously impeded traffic off the roads, and even the roads were affected, since the dunes shifted constantly. After severe storms, the roads became so deeply covered with sand that they had to be cleared. For this reason, a constant road-maintenance service was necessary where the roads crossed dune areas. A large area of dunes was also found north of the El Fareh wadi, between El Agheila and Marada along the shores of the Bay of Sirte. These dunes protected the German Marsa el Brega position against flanking attacks and forced the British to make a wide detour through the region south of the El Fareh wadi, where vehicular traffic was possible. The big dunes of the desert proper were all south of the zone of operations, and only a section of them along the border between Libya and Egypt played a role of some tactical importance, since they afforded protection for the south flank of the German Alamein positions. The dunes in the desert proper were not crescent shaped like the dunes along the coast but formed continuous ridges between four and fifty meters high that usually extended from north to south. A number of these ridges, driven by the wind, formed a labyrinthian confusion of dune ridges with completely encircled hollows in which the firm ground could be seen. This enormous ocean of dunes formed what might be called a collection of honeycomb dunes. To cross them, it was necessary to have the best cross-country vehicles available and to drive at top speed at the first dune, breaking through its crest, and on driving down the opposite slope, to gather speed for the next dune. While driving in this way, vehicles were enveloped in a dense cloud of dust that reduced visibility to practically nul. In this way, one to two kilometers might be covered per day. Serius losses in personnel and materiel were unavoidable. The Great Eastern Erg, a similar large dune area, extended from south Tunisia to south Algeria, close to the western border of Libya. If adequate German manpower had been available to extend the Mareth position across the Matmata Mountains and Fort Le Boeuf to this dune area, the German flank would have been as well protected as was the case in the Alamein line.
• (5) Salt Swamps.
  These swamps developed at those points where the water in the subsoil of the desert rose to the surface. Owing to the constant evaporation that takes place in the desert, the salts carried by the water were deposited, and the resultant brine formed either a lake or, when mixed with sand and clay, a patch of thick, tough mud on which salt-marsh vegetation could take root. Once a person was caught in a salt swamp, it was impossible for him to escape without help. Vehicles sunk in salt marshes could be recovered but only on terrain that was not too swampy. In really soft, swampy ground, the vehicle had to be pulled out by another vehicle, which was often extremely difficult and could only be done if the latter was on firm ground and had a strong engine. Most of the salt marshes were crossed by fords that were known to the natives. Many of the fords could carry vehicular traffic so that any salt marshes within a defensive position should always be kept under observation, and all fords crossing it must be carefully reconnoitered with the aid of native guides. Frequently, the salt marshes dried out completely and then presented no obstacle at all. The biggest salt marsh in the Libyan and Egyptian deserts was the Qattara Depression, the surface of which was eighty meters below sea level. This depression and its northern rim protected the flank of the El Alamein line. The swamp itself was skirted by a zone of soft sand varying between one and two kilometers in width, on which a few vehicles could travel with some difficulty. All other ground outside of the actual swamp, but within the Qattara Depression, was also soft and difficult to cross with vehicles. The salt marsh that was within the German zone of operations in the Marsa el Brega line was considerably smaller. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the sandy patches and dune areas, it provided good protection against a frontal attack, in spite of the fact that it had numerous fords. The salt marshes of southern Tunisia, called Schotts, were of more importance. The Schott el Djerid was the terrain feature that led to the decision to construct the Gabes line, which served as a rear line for the Mareth line. In most parts, the Schott el Djerid was considered an impassable obstacle, but its eastern part, the so-called El Fedjad Schott, had numerous good fords that could be crossed without difficulty by vehicles.
  Both Benghasi and Tripoli had good ports with ample capacities for shipping and landing, for which reason the former was used as the main supply base. The capacities in the ports of Derna and Bardia, as well as the naval port of Tobruk, were much smaller. There was no continuous railroad in Libya. The two railroads, each about thirty kilometers in length, in Tripolitania and in the Cyrenaica were of no military importance. The only permanent signal communications system consisted of an open-wire telephone line, on poles, from Tripoli to Bardia. The distances spanned were extremely great, and the line made only limited communication traffic possible. Furthermore, it was frequently interrupted by the frequent air attacks against the Via Balbia.

The water-supply facilities along the Via Balbia were adequate. The water holes in the desert, usually with a small supply of brackish water, were generally known only to the natives and were not indicated on maps. During the main part of the year, the air was very hot but dry, the hottest months being June, July, and August. The highest temperatures registered around midday were about 140 degrees Fahrenheit. At night, even in summer, temperatures dropped to about 5 degrees. In winter, from November to January, the nights were quite cold, temperatures dropping to around 5 degrees and rising again during the daytime to about 85 degrees. Rain fell only in winter but was then sometimes very heavy, starting suddenly and swamping extensive areas, sometimes stopping all traffic, even on roads, for protracted periods. The only other moisture was the heavy dew at daybreak and in the evenings. The outstanding weather feature was the sandstorms, which are called ghiblis. These sandstorms recurred pretty regularly every four weeks in all seasons of the year. They usually lasted three days, and since they reduced visibility to nothing, they brought all operations by ground and air forces to a standstill. During these sandstorms, the range of vision was often reduced to less than three meters so that orientation was impossible. Owing to the wind from the sea, the climate in the coastal regions was almost always healthy. In spite of the enormous number of flies, there were few cases of malaria. On the other hand, the troops proved extremely susceptible to jaundice and dysentery.

5. Order of Battle of Army and Luftwaffe Units

Army

The first units to be transferred to Africa between February and May 1941 were the corps headquarters of the Africa Corps and headquarters units (the corps signal battalion and several supply units), together with the 5th Light Division, which was later reorganized to form the 21st and 15th Panzer Divisions. During the summer months, a number of so-caIled oasis companies, a few battalions, and some coastal batteries were moved in, with an Africa Division Headquarters to control them. In the autumn of 1941, these units were consolidated to form a division, later designated the 90th Light Africa Division. Thus, the German combat troops in Africa at the end of 1941 consisted of two armored and one light division. The two armored divisions remained under the command of the German Africa Corps. In the summer of 1941, this corps and the other army units in Africa were placed under the command af the newly created Panzergruppe Afrika. On 21 January 1942, this headquarters was redesignated Headquarters, Panzer Army of Africa, which designation was changed again in the autumn of 1942 to Headquarters, German-Italian Panzer Army. In the summer of 1942 the 164th Light Africa Division and the Parachute Instruction Brigade were transferred to Africa. As they were transported by plane and since the sea transportation capacities were steadily sinking, these units never received their vehicles. Thus, they remained nonmobile to a great extent a fact that was to have very adverse effects on the withdrawal from El Alamein.

In 1942, about eighteen batteries that were not included in any of the divisions and consisted of Army Headquarters batteries, coastal batteries, and new batteries of captured gunswere consolidated as Army Headquarters Artillery. This artillery was organized in two regiments and was placed under the command of the commander of artillery in Africa. In addition, the reconnaissance battalions of the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions and the 580th Reconnaissance Battalion (a general headquarters [GHQ] unit} were consolidated to form a reconnaissance brigade under the immediate control of the Army Headquarters. The army also had the 900th Engineer Battalion, formerly a GHQ unit, available as a headquarters unit. At the end of 1942, therefore, the ground forces employed in combat consisted of the following :

• 2 armored divisions
• 2 light divisions
• 1 parachute brigade
• 1 reconnaissance brigade
• 2 regiments of headquarters artillery
• 1 engineer battalion
• the 288th Special Unit, a reinforced battalion originally organized as an elite battle group for employment in the Middle East.

This list does not include the numerous units available to the army for logistical support. The above divisions were organized as follows :

Armored Divisions

• Divisional Headquarters
• 2 Armored Infantry Regiments (each of 2 battalions)
• 1 Tank Regiment (2 battalions – 100 tanks each)
• 1 Artillery Regiment (2 light bns and 1 heavy bn)(9 batteries, with 24 light field howitzers, 8 heavy field howitzers, and four 10 cm guns)
• 1 Antitank Battalion (3 companies, each with 3 guns with prime movers)
• 1 Engineer Battalion (2 companies)
• 1 Signal Battalion (1 telephone and 1 radio company)
• Supply and transportation units

Total strength of the Armored Division : 12000

Light Panzer Division

• Divisional Headquarters
• 3 Infantry Regiments (2 battalions)
• 1 Artillery Regiment (2 light and 1 heavy battalion)(24 light and 12 heavy field howitzers)
• 1 Antitank Battalion (3 companies – armament as for panzer division)
• 1 Engineer Battalion (2 companies)
• 1 Signal Battalion (as for a panzer division)
• Supply and transportation units

Total strength of the Light Panzer Division : 12000

Parachute Instruction Brigade

• Brigade Headquarters
• 4 Battalions
• 1 Engineer Company
• 1 Light Artillery Battalion
• 1 Mixed Signal Company

Total strength of the Parachute Instruction Brigade, 5000
In addition to the above, the following units were landed in Tunis and employed in combat from November 1942 to the end of the campaign :

• Considerable parts of the 10th Panzer Division
• 1 battle group of regimental strength of the Hermann Goring Parachute Panzer Division
• Considerable parts of three infantry divisions
• a number of GHQ armored battalions
• the German Arab Legion, the latter of which was a unit of regimental strength

Thus, the ground forces employed in combat in the African theater of operations were equivalent to the following :

• 3 armored divisions at full strength
• 2 light divisions at full strength
• 2 infantry divisions at full strength
• 1 parachute brigade

Air Forces

The fact must be stressed at the outset that the air force units stationed in Africa were kept at a low level of strength to avoid further complicating the already difficult supply situation. Additional air support was given by air force units stationed at Italian or Greek air bases, which were transferred occasionally, for temporary periods, to Africa.
Three phases must be differentiated in respect to the organization and composition of air force units stationed in Africa, namely :

• Phase A, February-November 1941
• Phase B, December 1941-December 1942
• Phase C, January–May 1943

A

Command : German Air Force commander in Africa. The commander was subordinate to the X Air Corps (stationed in Athens and later on Crete) and was in tactical support of the Africa Corps (later the Panzer Army of Africa). Flying forces in Africa :

• 1 long-range reconnaissance squadron (F-121-type planes)
• 2 squadrons 14th Close Range Reconnaissance Group
• 1 fighter group (later replaced by the 77th Fighter Wing) 3 groups
• 2 groups of the 3rd Dive-Bomber Wing
• 1 destroyer plane group
• 1 desert-rescue squadron
• Antiaircraft artillery
• 1 regiment of 4 battalions, tactically assigned to the Africa Corps (later Panzergruppe Afrika)
• Air Signal troops
• 1 air signal battalion
• Logistical support troops
• 1 team detailed by the Luftwaffe General in Italy

B

Command : German Air Force commander in Africa. The commander was subordinate to the Second Air Force and was assigned tactical support of the Panzergruppe Afrika (later Panzer Army of Africa).

• Flying units in Africa, as in section a above.
• Antiaircraft Artillery organized in the summer of 1942 to form the 19th Flak Division and tactically assigned to the Panzer Army
• Air Signal troops : as in section a above
• Logistical support troops

From 1942 on, Air Force Administrative Command, Africa, was controlled by the Luftwaffe General in Italy.

C

Command : Air Corps Africa, with Air Commanders 1 and 2. The Air Corps Africa was subordinate to the 2d Air Force and was required to cooperate as follows :

• Air Corps Africa with Army Group Africa
• Air Commander 1 with the Fifth Panzer Army
• Air Commander 2 with the German-Italian Panzer Army (later redesignated the Italian First Army)

Flying units in Africa :

• 2 fighter wings (53d and 77th)
• 1 dive-bomber wing of 2 groups
• 1 destroyer plane group
• 2 antitank plane squadrons
• Reconnaissance, units as in section a above

Antiaircraft artillery :

• 19th Flak Division, tactically assigned to the German-Italian Panzer Army (later redesignated the Italian First Army)
• 20th Flak Division, tactically assigned to the Fifth Panzer Army
• Air Signal troops : 1 reinforced air signal battalion
• Logistical support troops Air Force Administration Headquarters Tunis, with three air base areas

The organization and the main items of armament as of January 1942 were the same as in Europe, with the exception of the additional supply units assigned for service in the desert, namely, the water supply units, the meteorological survey teams, and so forth. It must be emphasized in respect to the tables of organization that the units at no time had the stated authorized strengths. The actual strengths were constantly subject to fluctuations according to the losses suffered and the replacements received. Thus, the combat efficiency, which also depended on the shipment of replacements in personnel and materiel, also fluctuated.

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