Section 8
Reflection on the Absence of Russian Air Landings
It is surprising that during World War II the USSR did not attempt any large-scale airborne operations. Although Soviet Russia was the first country in the world which during peacetime had experimented with landing troops by air and had organized special units for this purpose*, its wartime operations were confined to the commitment of small units which were dropped back of the German front for the purpose of supporting partisan activities and which had no direct tactical or strategic effect. The reasons can only be surmised and might have been any or all of the following :
- 1. In 1941, when the Soviet Union entered the war, the Red Air Force was far inferior to the Luftwaffe. It is likely that the awareness of this inferiority persisted until the final stages of the war.
– 2. The Russians are primarily at home on the ground and are not in their element on the water or in the air.
- 3. In 1941 the parachute troops that had existed during peacetime may well have been expended in ground combat during the initial emergency. Later on, other parachute units were activated. Perhaps they lacked the necessary confidence or were considered too valuable to be risked in operations for which-success was not assured. It is also possible that during the last phase of the war such operations simply were no longer regarded as necessary.
- 4. Marshal Tukhachevski was the originator of the Soviet parachute forces and after his removal the driving force in this new and untried field may well have been lacking.
Be that as it may, the fact that during World War II the Soviet armed forces did not carry out any large-scale airborne operations, such as were carried out by the Germans in Crete and by the Allies in Holland, should not lead to the false conclusion that the Soviet Union is not concerned with this problem or would fail to make use of this new arm during future military operations.
(*) This is a common mistake to say that the Russian where the first to experiments with Airborne Troops. In fact, the first that faced the eventuality of Parachuting Troops into enemy occupied territory were the American in 1918 when Gen Mitchell planned to let drop troops of the 1st Division in the vicinity of Metz, France. It didn’t happen because the War was over before. This firsts to experiment Airborne Troops for a Plain Military use where the Germans, the French and the Italians. Bill Lee, one US Officer which was in Germany during the 1930s, had time enough to study the testing of the, soon to become the Luftwaffe, in the experiments with parachutes for airplane crews members but also for special trained combat combat soldiers to be dropped on designed target on the ground. Back in the USA, he got the permission to experiment parachuting for the same purpose and created the 1st American Parachute Test Platoon. Lt Leonid Minov which was a Soviet Military Observer in the USA was even invited to participate in the test and jump himsefd using the old T-4 Parachute. Back in the USSR, Minow and Motchowsky started working on the deployment of large scale units but they did the first battalion size jump in 1941, long after the 501st and 502nd Regiment were almost ready for combat. So, in 1940 when World War Two started, the only Paratrooper Units available for combat on our planet where one Italian Airborne Regiment, one French Paratrooper Regiment and the German Fallschirmjaeger.
(Gunter)
On paper there were two companies of French Paratroopers in 1940, but they were not at full strength. They were nevertheless considered ready for action, and their deployment was planned as part of the Allied entry in the Netherlands, but eventually they were not dropped. Their standard plane was the Potez 650. The corps franc is a special infiltration and deep reconnaissance unit. It is the equivalent of the German Stosstruppen. Concerning WW2, these corps francs were created in September 1939 with specially selected volunteers at the battalion, regimental and/or divisional level. These elite troops had the mission to infiltrate behind the enemy lines, to collect information, to organize ambushes or raids and to take prisoners. The smallest element of a corps franc is a team of 6 men called Equipe or Sizaine. All the members of the team have a combat knife, a handgun (revolver or pistol) and many grenades for close combat. These men are usually armed with the Carbine Berthier Mle1892 M16 and in each team there are usually 1-2 SMGs Erma-Vollmer but also MAS-38 SMGs, Suomi M-31 from which 150 had been sent on the north-eastern front in 1939 and even German captured SMGs and even German captured SMGs) and 1 FM 24/29 LMG to increase the firepower (some captured MG-34 were also used). Some shotguns were also used during the patrols. They carried also satchel charges if the mission required explosives.
Several teams could be grouped together, for example a squad of 12 men will include 2 FM 24/29 LMGs and 2-4 SMGs and has therefore more automatic weapons than a regular infantry squad.
The bigger unit including several teams is called the Groupe Franc or Trentaine with 5 teams (30 men), it corresponds roughly to a platoon. The Groupe Franc is generally commanded by a Lieutenant and is completely independent. Several Groupes Francs can be grouped for a specific mission into a Groupement Franc. Such a Groupement Franc includes usually a maximum of 6 Groupes Francs (180 men), roughly a company.
The SES (Section d’Eclaireurs Skieurs) (ski-scouts platoons) are elite deep reconnaissance troops. They play the same role than the corps francs but they are specialized in mountain warfare and winter conditions. They are included in the mountain infantry units.
Fred Geille was born on 19 November 1896. In November 1914, at 18 years old he enlisted in the infantry and fought bravely on different fronts. He is wounded during an assault in April 1915. In 1917, his platoon leader is killed; he takes the command of the unit and pulls the Germans back. He is then promoted 2nd Lt and is awarded a citation by the division. But Geille had a passion for aviation and in 1917 he is formed as aerial observer and enlisted in the BR 7 squadron. He behaved with the same bravery as in the infantry during various missions over the enemy lines. On 15 November 1918, he is awarded a second citation. In July 1919, he is sent in Poland in Gen Haller Blue Division, which was fully armed and equipped in French gear. He earns in Poland a third citation as excellent observer. On 25 May 1919, he flew during a reconnaissance over Tarnopol, 150-KM behind the enemy lines. The aircrafts was damaged by enemy fire at low altitude but he managed to bring back precious intelligence informations. Back in France, he earned is pilot wings on 7 October 1920 and served successively in France, in North Africa and in the Levant (Syria and Lebanon), where he is promoted Captain at Christmas 1927. Back in France, he will be in 1935-1937 at the origin of the first French Airborne Troops.
In 1935 an Airborne Training Center is created by Capt Geille at Avignon-Pujaut. The first French airborne troops were called Infanterie de l’Air and officially created on 1 April 1937, after a decision taken on 20 October 1936. Two Groupes de l’Infanterie de l’Air (GIA.) were formed (601 GIA, Reims, France and 602 GIA, Baraki, Algeria).
Each group is composed of :
- Headquarters
- Transport Aircraft Squadron
- Airborne Infantry Company (CIA or Compagnie d’Infanterie de l’Air composed : 175 men organized in 3 platoons, 1 support platoon (2 37-MM TR infantry guns and 2 Hotchkiss Mle1914 HMGs).
Groupe de l’infanterie de l’air – GIA-601 1937
- Commander Mayet (after commandant Arsac)
- Commander Infantry Co Capt Sauvagnac assisted by Lt Glaizot (the Lieutenants in the squads are Le Bourhis, Mayer, Audebert, Lespina, Fournier and Foucault)
Groupe de l’infanterie de l’air – GIA-602 1937
- Commander commandant Michel
- Commander Iinfantry Co Capt Loizeau assisted by Lieutenant Dupouts (the Lieutenants in the squads are Fleury, Morel, Chevalier, Lemaître, Lemire and Bastouil)
Each 12-men squad is armed with Mousqueton Berthier Mle1892 M16, 2 FM 24/29 LMGs per squad, one VB Launcher and hand grenades (36 carbines and 6 LMGs in one platoon). The MAS36 CR39, a MAS 36 with foldable stock specially designed for airborne troops was never put into service before the armistice. Seven Boys AT Rifles were also already used in the Corps Francs in 1939. The 37mm infantry guns and HMGs are launched in separate containers in the bomb bay of the planes but the small arms are attached to the men during the drop. The doctrine and formation are inspired from the big Russian training observed in Kiev in 1935. Many specific equipment, girdles for the fixation of various equipments, the leg bag etc. are specially studied and realized by the French Air Force. This equipment were presented to the British forces in 1939 and adopted by the British SAS. The parachutes are at first American Irvin sport models imported by the SGP (Société Générale des Parachutes) from the factory in England and Russian copies of the Irvin model and later with French models, Aviorex 120 and 130 models.
Concerning the transport aircrafts squadrons :
- GIA-601 started with Potez 650 and received Farman 224 in September 1939
- GIA-602 started with LeO 213 and was equipped with Potez 650 in March 1938
On 7 October 1937, capitaine Sauvagnac beats the world record of free fall without inhalator with 74 seconds. At First the doctrine is concerning the use of small saboteurs groups for the destruction of factories or bridges. Much training was organized for the new airborne troops. For example in August 1937 the 601-CIA seized a bridge on the Durance and in September 1937 after a drop of 100-M only in a rainy sky they seized by surprise the HQ of a whole division. In October 1938 the whole 601-CIA is dropped on BA112 airbase by 5 planes and in less than 3 minutes after the beginning of the drop the first 37-MM rounds were shot. The German observers invited to this presentation were impressed and unlike the French high command they used these lessons. In September 1939, the 601-CIA is based in Avignon-Pujaut and the 602-CIA in Montélimar. In November 1939 they are directed towards Calais where they keep on alert, ready to embark in Farman 224 planes during one week. They were thought to jump over the Flessingue airbase and Arnemuisen isthmus in the Netherlands but the operation was never launched. The French airborne companies are then used to form 4 Groupes Francs (52 men from the 601-CIA and 91 men from the 602-CIA commanded by Capt Glaizot) under the authority of the 28 Alpine Infantry Division in Alsace. These groups are based in the no man’s land, in Lembach (Alsace), 12-KM NE of Niederbronn (in the operational area of the 7th and 27th BCA – bataillon de chasseurs alpins -, alpine troops).
On February 14, 1940, the four Groupes Francs are commanded by Capt Henri Glaizot whose HQ was in Lembach:
- Lt Chevalier (Lembach)
- Lt Le Bourhis (Lembach)
- Lt Audebert (Obersteinbach, at 15 km west of Lembach)
- Lt Lemaître (Obersteinbach, at 15 km west of Lembach)
Usually the work was divided into 3 days of patrol and 1 resting day during which Capt Glaizot who is also a pilot, uses a recon plane from the observation squadron of Haguenau. From 14 February to 11 March 1940 they led 28 patrols and 23 ambushes, sometimes more than 3 km behind the German lines. They lost only 2 KIAs (Sgt Baratte, 602-CIA, on 24 February and Sgt Solacroup, 601-CIA, on 7 March) and 3 WIAs. They scored about 30 German soldiers KIA. From 11 to 17 March, they returned in Niederbronn in the French lines and 54 French parachutists were awarded citations and on 22 March the Groupes Francs are disbanded, the men return to their Compagnie d’Infanterie de l’Air.
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After finishing this study the author received additional information about an airborne operation carried out by the Russians late in the summer of 1943. Under cover of darkness, the Russians parachuted approximately three regiments into the area northwest of Kremenchug, about 25 miles behind the German front on the Dnepr. The exact date and place could not be given from memory. Only infantry forces without heavy weapons were dropped and they showed no initiative after the jump. Landing in small groups scattered over an area about 25 miles across, each group dug in on the spot, making no effort to contact other groups. Apparently they had no contact with their take-off base, and there were no simultaneous attacks by Russian ground forces across the Dnepr. Within a few days the individual groups were mopped up with little difficulty at their separate landing places by German security formations and reserves. It was assumed that the Russian airborne troops would make their positions known to Russian airplanes by fires at night. The Germans therefore lit fires all along the river banks from Kremenchug to Kiev during the night following the jump. The Russians parachuted no further troops nor did they drop any supplies after the night of the landing. It is unknown whether a follow-up was intended or if it did not take place because of the uncertainty of the location of the landed forces brought about by the German deceptive measures.
The whole enterprise left the impression of inadequate preparation. Inadequate reconnaissance, mistakes in navigation during the approach and jump, lack of contact among the individual groups and between them and their base, as well as the complete passivity of the parachuted troops were the main deficiencies. The enterprise must be considered a complete failure. This may be why it remained so obscure that all German officers interviewed in connection with the original study, including Gen Student, Gen Blumentritt, and Gen Meindl (all officers with a comprehensive knowledge in this field), unanimously and independently stated that no large-scale airborne operations had been carried out by the Russians during World War II. As a result of investigation it was confirmed by a second informant that this Russian airborne operation actually took place at Kremenchug, but no further particulars could be procured. Although this Russian airborne operation disclosed no new important experience in opposing airborne attacks, it seems appropriate to mention it if only for its singularity. Its complete failure may be a further reason, in addition to those mentioned above, for the absence of other large-scale Russian airborne operations in the course of the war. The impression prevails that tactically and technically the Russians could not meet the requirements of such an enterprise. Further reasons may be that the Russian soldier as a rule is not a good individual fighter but prefers to fight in mass formations, and that the junior Russian commanders lacked initiative and aggressiveness, two qualities that are basic requirements in a parachute officer. The main effort of the Russian paratroopers during the war was without doubt in partisan warfare, an old method of combat that has always been favored by the Russians. In this field parachuting was widely exploited. However, this is a special subject having nothing to do with tactical airborne operations, and is therefore outside the province of this study.
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Chapter 3
Conclusions
Section 1 – Evaluation of Past Airborne Experience
In spite of rockets and atom bombs, it is still the possession of the land, the conquest of enemy territory, that will decide the issue in a war. The possession of the land is the visible sign of victory, and its occupation is a guarantee of the exercise of complete control The occupying power definitely deprives the enemy of all chances of exploiting the territory with regard to natural resources, raw materials, industries, population, air bases, etc., while the occupier is able to utilize these for his own benefit and in the end force the enemy to surrender. The prerequisite, however, for the capture, the occupation, and the holding of a territory is the elimination of the enemy fighting forces which can defend the country and dispute its possession.
For a long time the most effective means of eliminating the enemy fighting forces seemed to be the method of envelopment, which is stressed particularly in the German theory of the art of war. An envelopment is directed at the enemy’s weakest spot and cuts him off from his rear communications. During World War I the increasing effectiveness of weapons and the expansion of armies lessened the chances for large-scale envelopments and led to extended front lines with flanks anchored on impregnable points. The tactics of envelopment were replaced by the break-through, which during World War II was the objective of the mobile and combat-efficient panzer formations. Airborne operations, carried out for the first time during World War II, point to a new trend. An air landing behind the enemy front is, after all, nothing but an envelopment by air, an envelopment executed in the third dimension. Herein lies its significance and an indication of the role it will play in future wars. World War II has shown that airborne operations are practicable; furthermore, the results have proved that air landings are not one-time measures which owe their effectiveness exclusively to the element of surprise and then can no longer be applied. On the contrary, the events of World War II have demonstrated that it is extremely difficult for a defender to prevent or render ineffectual any airborne operations which are carried out with superior forces.
The airborne operations carried out during World War II still represent in every respect purely tactical measures taken in closest cooperation with the ground forces. Strategic concepts rarely entered into the picture. Even the capture of an island represented an individual action of strictly limited scope. The continued technical improvement of all types of aircraft since the end of the war with regard to speed, range, and carrying capacity makes it appear quite possible that the scope of airborne operations will also increase in proportion to the number of forces and weapons which can be employed. Even today, it is probably no longer utopian to think of air landings as large-scale envelopments or even, beyond that, as outflanking movements in the third dimension, which will no longer merely aim at attacking the enemy’s position from the rear, but will force him to relinquish his position in order to form an inverted front against the attacking forces that have landed far behind his lines.
(Photo http://www.afrikakorps.org/)
For the most part, such considerations are limited by technical factors. This study cannot determine what these limitations are and how they apply to the present or the future, if only for the reason that the author lacks the necessary technical information. Besides, at the present rapid rate of technical progress, today’s daydreams may be accomplished facts by tomorrow. This report, therefore, merely represents an analysis of some of the problems involved in airborne operations and a general evaluation of the resulting possibilities.
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Section 2 – Limitations of Airborne Operations
First of all, it should be remembered that airborne operations are governed by the same strategic and tactical principles that apply to any envelopment or flanking movement. A correct evaluation of the terrain and the time element, the ratio of friendly and enemy forces as well as the proper depth of attack in proportion to the available troops, the concentration of forces in a main effort and arrangements for containing the enemy at other points, the elements of surprise and deception-all have to be weighed and taken into account just as carefully as in ground operations. Consequently, they do not have to be discussed in further detail at this point. The new element in airborne operations is the peculiarity of the approach via the third dimension, that is, by air. The accompanying difficulties as well as advantages should therefore be analyzed with particular care and must be taken into account in an evaluation of the above-mentioned factors. In the main, this new method of attack by air gives rise to the following difficulties :
- 1. The forces employed for air landings are highly vulnerable while they are on the approach route. This necessitates control of the air along the entire route, from the take-off points up to and including the landing area. Apart from other factors, the geographic limits of the area in which the attacker enjoys air supremacy determine the depth of a large-scale airborne operation.
- 2. An air landing, more so than any operation on the ground, is a thrust into unknown territory. The conventional means of reconnaissance and sources of information offer inadequate results and require a great deal of time. From the moment the airborne troops land, they face surprises against which they are not protected by advance reconnaissance and security measures and from which they are no longer able to escape. Consequently, every airborne operation involves a greater risk than ordinary ground combat, requires more time for preparation, and entails a distinct moment of weakness during the first phase of landing.
- 3. After the initial landing the fighting strength and mobility of airborne forces depend on their chances for resupply by air. It will no doubt be possible to improve the purely technical facilities available for this purpose. In this respect the military planners need not be afraid of asking too much from the men who are responsible for research and development. The really decisive factor is whether the military situation in the air permits the air transport of supplies. Just how far the attacker’s air supremacy can be extended, not only in space but also in time, is a fundamentally important question. Another vital consideration is the time interval until contact with friendly ground troops can and must be established. The proper evaluation of these possibilities will always be the determining factor for the extent and scope of airborne operations and hence for the selection of suitable objectives as well. These difficulties are not insurmountable. They will be overcome by technical progress, organization and training of the forces, and proper tactical and strategic commitment, always of course within reasonable limits and with the necessary prerequisites.
- 4. However, there is one unalterable difficulty-the inflexibility of an airborne operation at the time of execution. Once the plan has been decided upon and the operation has been set into motion, the entire action necessarily has to unfold according to schedule. The only control the high command can still exercise is through the commitment of its reserves. The initiative exercised by intermediate and lower echelons, which in ordinary ground combat assures flexibility of adjustment to the existing situation and which in the German Army was particularly stressed as a vital combat requirement, is largely eliminated during airborne operations. It cannot begin to take effect until an attack is launched from the captured airhead. Only in part can these deficiencies be offset by careful and detailed preparations, which take time, and by committing even greater quantities of troops and materiel, which again proves that airborne warfare is a “rich man’s” weapon.
Kesselring comments, inflexibility of airborne operations :
I do not agree that airborne operations are absolutely tied to a fixed schedule and are therefore too rigid in their execution. Naturally, an airborne operation executed according to plan will be assured the greatest probability of success. Should the situation require a sweeping change in plans, however, this can be carried out by signal communications from ground to air and between the flying formations. This will require the preparation of alternate plans and intensive training of the units. Formations on the approach flight can be recalled or can be ordered to land at previously designated alternate fields. This is less complicated in the case of later serials. In my opinion such changes can be carried out more easily in the air than on the ground. In land warfare, once large formations are committed in a certain direction toward a definite objective, major and minor changes involve equal difficulties. There is no reason why this should be any different in an airborne operation.
Section 3 – Advantages of Airborne Operations
Despite the cost in men and materiel, airborne operations offer such outstanding advantages that no future belligerent with the necessary means at his disposal can be expected to foregos using this combat method. The following are the main advantages :
- 1. The airborne operation makes it possible for the attacker to carry out a vertical envelopment or to outflank front lines or lines with protected flanks; it also enables him to surmount terrain obstacles which interfere with the movements of ground troops, such as wide rivers, channels, mountains, and deserts.
- 2. The airborne operation can be launched from the depth of the attacker’s zone. It develops with extraordinary speed and offers remarkable opportunities for surprise attacks, with regard to time and place, and thus forestalls any countermeasures by the enemy.
- 3. The psychological effect of vertical envelopment is considerably greater than that produced by horizontal envelopment. It can affect the enemy command and troops solely by reason of its menace-the uncertainty of when and where an air landing might take place. The consequent effect on the population of the country, either positive or negative as the case may be, should also not be underestimated.
Section 4 – Requirements for Success
An armed force desiring to overcome the difficulties which arise from the use of airborne operations and seeking to make the most of the advantages offered by such operations should, in consideration of the statements made so far, arrive at the following conclusions :
- 1. The attacker’s air force should be so strong that even at the beginning of the war it will either be wholly superior to the enemy, or, in fighting the enemy air force, will seriously weaken that force and thus pave the way for mastery of the air with regard to time and space.
- 2. It is necessary to have available a highly qualified specialized force for the execution of airborne operations. Air landings require tough fighters eager for action, an intensive and diversified training, the best kind of equipment, and ample air-transport space. It is advisable to recruit this specialized force from volunteers. Men who have been taken from the militia or conscript army and have received only brief training, might require an extended tour of active duty. Above all, however, this force should be activated in peacetime, not in cadres only but in full strength, since such a specialized force cannot be organized quickly. These requirements again demonstrate that airborne operations will always be something which only the “rich man” can afford.
- 3. Any planning for airborne operations on a large scale should include preparations for the movement by air of large ground unit (divisions) to permit the prompt reinforcement of airborne troops after their initial landing. The necessary adjustments with regard to equipment and organization must be carefully considered and applied, and specialized gear must be at hand.
- 4. It should be realized that an airborne operation is as rapid in its execution as it is time consuming in its preparation and affords neither much freedom of maneuver nor a great deal of flexibility; it must be prepared well in advance. Once it has been set into motion, its direction and objective can no longer be changed. Even in peace-time it is therefore necessary to draw up blueprints for certain conceivable airborne operations, blueprints which are to be carefully modified on the basis of current information obtained in the course of actual hostilities. If this work has been done, the time required for preparation in each individual case can be considerably reduced. Only through foresighted preparatory work covering several likely situations is it at all possible to achieve a limited degree of flexibility in the execution of airborne operations.
- 5. Finally, it should also be mentioned that air landings, even more than any other operations, are dependent on the weather. The more territory an airborne operation is supposed to cover, the greater will be the need for a long-range weather forecast system, which even during peacetime will have to be set up with an eye to functioning under such wartime limitations as the absence of weather data from enemy countries.
Section 5 – Anti Airborne Defense
With regard to defense measures against airborne operations, the following conclusions may be drawn from this study :
- 1. The best method of defense is and always will be a strong air force.
- 2. The next requirement is a well-organized observation (radar) and warning system; it is essential to succeed in setting up this network quickly, even in a war of movement, and to adapt it to the fluctuating situations.
- 3. Local defense measures and preparations for all-around defense are increasingly important for rear elements. In addition, it will be necessary to establish clearly who, in the rear areas, will be in command of all forces which have to be committed in case of enemy air landings, and who will be responsible-for making the necessary arrangements to this effect.
- 4. In an era of constantly growing possibilities for operations far behind the front lines, the need for prompt and forceful action against hostile air landings will eventually force any belligerent to scatter his strategic reserves over the whole of his communications zone, and even parts of the zone of the interior; he may also be compelled to hold large forces in readiness for the express purpose of defending his rear areas against long-range enemy airborne operations.
Section 6 – Future Possibilities
Future wars will offer far-reaching possibilities for the employment of airborne operations. The selection and scope of the objectives will always depend on the available forces (air force, airborne troops) and consequently will be a question of war potential. But the employment of airborne operations as a weapon in future wars also will depend on an early decision to make use of it, because air landings cannot be improvised, either in obtaining the necessary forces or in the technical aspects of the operation itself.
At the beginning of World War II, the strategic employment of armor completely changed the concepts of warfare carried over from World War I; it is quite conceivable that, at the beginning of a future war, the employment of large airborne units will play a similar role.
Appendix Notes on German Operations
Oberst Freiherr August Friedrich von der Heydte
Dr. jur. Dr. rer. pol. Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte[a] (30 March 1907 – 7 July 1994) was a German Luftwaffe officer who served with the Fallschirmjäger during World War II, reaching the rank of Oberstleutnant. After the war, he served in the Bundeswehr, reaching the rank of Brigadegeneral der Reserve.
Early life
Von der Heydte was born into the nobility in Munich, Bavaria. His father, a Freiherr (roughly equivalent to a baron) had enjoyed a successful career with the Royal Bavarian Army, serving with distinction during World War I. His mother immigrated from France. The von der Heydtes were stout Roman Catholics, and Friedrich attended a Munich Catholic school, achieving excellent grades. He is also a cousin of Claus Von Stauffenberg. After completion of his schooling, Friedrich followed his father’s path and joined the Reichswehr. After an unsuccessful application to join the cavalry, Friedrich was posted to Infanterie-Regiment 19 on 1 April 1925. He did not give up on his goal of joining the cavalry, and soon secured a posting as an officer cadet in Kavallerie-Regiment 18.
In 1927, von der Heydte was released from military service to attend Innsbruck University, studying Law and Economics. During this time, he became a private tutor to pay his university fees, as despite their noble status, his family was in dire financial troubles. He received a degree in Economics at Innsbruck University. In 1927, von der Heydte was awarded his degree in law at Graz University, and traveled to Berlin to continue his studies. Late in the year, he secured a posting to a diplomatic school in Vienna. During his college years, the young von der Heydte developed decidedly liberal views, and on his return to Germany, found himself at odds with popular opinion.
By 1934, von der Heydte obtained Austrian citizenship while also maintaining German/Bavarian citizenship. He had become involved in several brawls with pro-Nazi students, and only evaded the Gestapo by rejoining his old cavalry regiment. During this period he received a stipend from the Carnegie Institute for Peace. In 1934 he re-joined the Reichswehr, and it 1935 he was transferred to Kavallerie-Regiment 15 and promoted to leutnant within the Wehrmacht. He again secured his temporary release from the military for study, and traveled to the Netherlands where he furthered his education at The Hague.
Late in 1935, von der Heydte’s company of the regiment was transformed from a cavalry to an anti-tank company. After studying for over two years in The Hague, he returned to the military, where he attended a General Staff Officer’s course over the winter of 1938-39. In August 1939, he was recalled to his company in preparation for the planned Invasion of Poland, Fall Weiß.
War Career
Crete
Von der Heydte commanded the 1st battalion of the 3rd Fallschirmjäger Regiment in Crete in May 1941. His battalion was the first to enter Canea, for which he was awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross.
Mid-War
Von der Heydte fought in Russia and North Africa. In his memoirs he stated that he watched an Italian tank division be destroyed while the Germans withdrew after the Second Battle of El Alamein.
Normandy
Von der Heydte was commander of the 6th Fallschirmjäger Regiment. The unit was formed from veteran paratroopers and Luftwaffe ground personnel in early 1944 at Köln-Wahn. The Regiment had an average age of 17 1/2, with a combined strength of 3457 men as of May 19, and around 4500 men by June 6, 1944. The dispositions of three battalions on June 6th, 1944 were as follows :
- 1st battalion advancing towards Sainte-Marie-du-Mont to relieve the strongpoint W5 and reinforce the defense of Utah Beach
- 2nd battalion advancing towards Sainte-Mère-Église and attempt to make contact with 795 Ost battalion (Georgian)
- 3rd battalion remaining southwest of Carentan to provide flank security.
On D-Day, about 500 US paratroopers dropped southwest of Carentan. Skirmishing between airborne troops of both sides went on throughout the night. The 1st battalion managed to reach Sainte-Marie-du-Mont, only 6 kilometers from strongpoint W5; but finding the town held by the elements of 101st Airborne, the battalion dug in among the hedgerows outside the town. On June 7, after fighting a combined assault of US paratroopers and tanks most of the day, the battalion was destroyed in a fighting withdrawal towards Carentan. About 300 men surrendered. Only 25 reached Carentan. The 2nd battalion found Sainte-Mère-Église held by the 507th Infantry Regiment (United States), fought until its ammunition ran low and withdrew towards St. Come-du-Mont. From the town’s church tower (and artillery observation post) Von der Heydte saw the vast Allied invasion armada 11 kilometers away. After heavy fighting on June 7, the 2nd and 3rd battalions were withdrawn into Carentan. Von der Heydte was ordered by Feldmarschall Erwin Rommel to defend Carentan to the last man, since it was the critical junction between Utah Beach and Omaha Beach. Starting around the night of June 10, US troops entered the outskirts of Carentan, and by morning of June 11 fierce fighting went from house to house. To illustrate the intensity: a US battalion (3rd of 502nd PIR) had 700 men entering Carentan and after two days’ fighting only 132 men were left. By dusk on June 11, Von der Heydte withdrew what remained of his men out of Carentan to avoid encirclement. The commander of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division was furious and wanted to arrest Von der Heydte, only intervention from Von der Heydte’s higher ranking brethren saved the situation. A counterattack on June 12 failed to retake the town. For their battle at Carentan, the German paratroopers earned the nickname “Lions of Carentan” from the US paratroopers. Von der Heydte’s regiment was subsequently involved in the intense hedgerow fighting (also known as the battle of the Bocage) defending every inch of ground that was characteristic of the Normandy campaign.
On July 22, Von der Heydte’s 6th Fallschirmjäger Regiment was mentioned in a Wehrmacht communique when 32 of his men made a daring raid at St. Germain-sur-Seves on an entire American battalion (the 1/358th-90th Infantry Division), capturing 265 men, including 11 officers. St. Germain-sur-Seves is located between Carentan and Perier. Oberfeldwebel Alexander Uhlig leading the raid was awarded the Knight’s Cross.
On August 6, Von der Heydte’s regiment participated in Operation Lüttich, the disastrous Mortain counterattack attempting to cut off the Allies’ advance at the Avranches bridgehead. The German Seventh Army was subsequently encircled at Falaise Pocket, the final and epic battle of the Normandy campaign.
In September 1944 his regiment was involved in defending the German lines in North Brabant (The Netherlands) against the Allied Forces attacking in the operation Market Garden
The war ended for Von der Heydte when he was taken prisoner in December 1944 during the Ardenne Offensive. He led the last large scale German airborne drop of the war, Operation Stösser.
On December 16, 1944, his unit of 1200 men, Kampfgruppe Von der Heydte, was to drop on the main road junction at Belle-Croix (Jalhay), 11 kilometers north of Malmédy. It was the German first paratroopers nighttime drop in WWII. There also was no prior reconnaissance or aerial photographs. By a combination of Allied flak and low visibility, the transport aircraft greatly dispersed the paratroopers. Some landed 50 miles behind the German frontlines. Others landed as far away as Holland. The German paratrooper dispersal confounded the Allies as much as the US/British paratrooper dispersal on D-Day confounded the Germans. However, aside from that, Kampfgruppe Von der Heydte did not result in much tactical value. Only 125 men made it to the actual landing zone, with no heavy weapons. Cut off and without supplies, Von der Heydte had his men try to break through Allied lines and reach the German front. He himself had a broken arm. On December 24, he had a farmer’s son send a surrender note to the Allies. He was held as a prisoner of war in England until July 12, 1947.
Section 1 – Equipment of the German Parachute Troops
During the war, the weapons and equipment of German parachute troops did not differ essentially from those of the infantry. The paratroop automatic rifle (FJ-42), which used standard ammunition, was the only special type of small arms developed. It was adopted because the automatic rifle of the infantry did not use standard ammunition.
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In any paratroop operation the most harassing problem was the method of carrying ammunition. Since the rifle was attached to the man while jumping, the weapons containers, most of which after 1942 were transportable, became available for carrying ammunition.
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In 1944 a so-called ammunition vest for each man was introduced in some parachute units and proved successful.
(Fallschirmjäger Ammunitions Vest (bandoleer) Cal. 7.92-MM)
(Fallschirmjäger Ammunitions Vest (bandoleer) Cal. 7.92-MM-FG-42)
(Photo http://commons.wikimedia.org/)
Immediately after the Crete operation the paratroops had requested the construction of special midget tanks (Lilliputpanzer), which could be carried along on airborne operations, as well as special light weight portable antitank guns. Experiments were begun in 1942 on a two-man tank which could be transported in a large troop-carrying glider and which because of its shape was called a “turtle.” Because of difficulties in the armament production program, the experiments were discontinued toward the end of 1942 before it was possible to form a definite opinion on the usefulness of the model. In any case, it seems to have met the Army’s three requirements of low silhouette, high speed, and great cross-country mobility as fully as possible.
In 1942 the paratroops were given a 48-MM / 42-MM antitank gun with tapered bore and solid projectile as a special weapon for antitank fighting instead of the impractical 37-MM antitank gun, which was difficult to transport. The gun did not prove especially successful in Africa against the heavy British tanks and its production was discontinued in 1943. At the same time the so-called Panzerwurfmine (magnetic antitank hand grenade) was introduced as a special weapon for fighting tanks at close range, but it was soon replaced by the Panzerfaust (recoilless antitank grenade and launcher, both expendable).
In autumn 1944 the German engineer Schardien was working on a new close-range antitank device for airborne use which would have been easier to transport than the Panzerfaust; he was probably unable to complete his experiments. Some of the paratroop units used the so-called Einstossflammenwerfer (one-thrust flame thrower) of the SS, which was considerably better adapted to paratroop use than the Army flame thrower.
The greatest headache for the German paratroop command was the lack of artillery in support of infantry fighting. The German paratroops were equipped with the excellent 75-MM and 105-MM airborne recoilless guns; both had short barrels and carriages made of light metal alloy. In suitable terrain the 75-MM gun could be easily drawn by two men, and its elevation was the same as that of the 37-MM AT gun of the Army. The maximum range was 3,850 yards for the 75-MM gun and 9,000 yards for the 105-MM gun. Both had the following disadvantages :
- a. A large amount of smoke and fumes was generated, and the flash toward the rear was visible at night for a great distance.
- b. They could be used only as flat-trajectory weapons. Attempts to use the airborne recoilless guns as high-angle weapons were not satisfactory. Moreover, in an airborne operation it was seldom possible to carry along the necessary amount of ammunition or have it brought up later. Thus, as a rule, only important point targets could be attacked with single rounds, generally from an exposed fighting position.
75-MM LG 40
This is a light recoilless weapon designed for use with airborne forces. This weapon was in service in time for the airborne invasion of Crete where it proved to be successful. It is air dropped in two loads each contained in a wicker container. This weapon was also adopted for use with other light troops such as mountain infantry as its airborne origin made it satisfactory as a pack weapon. Like all recoilless weapons the LG40 has a substantial back blast creating a hazardous cone behind the weapon. The carriage is not designed for high towing speeds and no gun shield is provided.
- Crew : 3
- Ammunition : 75-MM LG40
- Introduced : 1940
- Weight : 146-KG
- Ammunition Weight : 16.4-KG
- Reload : 2
- Shield : No
- Ammunitions : AP, HEAT, HE
105-MM LG 42
The 105-MM LG42 is very similar to the 75-MM LG40 with the exception of the size of the weapon. It was also used during the invasion of Crete and proved its usefulness. The LG42 was also used by other light troops such as mountain infantry as it made a good pack weapon. The weapon and carriage are designed for rapid dismantling and assembly. The carriage is not designed for high speed travel but a small gunshield is provided for crew protection.
- Crew : 4
- Ammunition : 105-MM LG40
- Introduced : 1940
- Weight : 389-KG
- Ammunition Weight : 35-KG
- Reload : 2
- Shield : Yes
- Ammunitions : AP, HEAT, HE
Besides these weapons, 150-MM rocket projectiles were used in the Crete operation. They were fired from wooden carrying crates, which also served as aerial delivery containers. These rockets did not prove successful; because of their high degree of dispersion they were suitable only for use against area targets and in salvo fire. However, the quantity of projectiles needed for such a purpose could not be transported on an airborne operation, and a JU-52 (German troop carrier) could carry and drop only four projectiles at a time.
The parachute troops were generally forced to rely on Army signal equipment which, to be sure, was available to them in far greater quantities than it was to any other units. The Dora and Friedrich radio sets proved very successful in German air landing operations. Ever since 1942 the troops had repeatedly requested in addition a small, portable short-range radio set for communicating between companies, but no such set was introduced.
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(Photo http://www.wehrmacht-awards.com)
Several units, therefore, made use of captured American equipment. For the projected Malta operation of one parachute battalion, the engineering firm of Siemens-Halske supplied a portable radio set for maintaining contact with the base. It had a definite range of 180 miles, could be operated without interruption for six hours, and could easily be carried by one man.
Carrier pigeons and messenger dogs proved very successful in airborne operations; the former for communicating with the base, the latter for communication within the company or from company to battalion. The dogs, equipped with a parachute that was automatically disconnected from the harness after landing, generally jumped very willingly and without accidents. In 1942 a signal cartridge, protected against misuse by the enemy by a special contrivance, was introduced on an experimental basis. However, the experiment was very soon discontinued.
Section 2 – German Employment of Troop Carrier Units
In Holland in 1940, the Germans came to realize the disadvantage of the parachute commander’s inability to exercise any direct authority over the troop-carrier units; the two were coordinated, but neither was subordinate to the other. Consequently, before carrying out the Crete operation the troop-carrier units were incorporated into the parachute corps, of which they constituted an integral part under a special Luftwaffe officer (Fliegerfuehrer). This arrangement did not last long. The operations in Russia and North Africa required the concentration of all air transport services directly under the commander in chief of the Luftwaffe to assure the prompt execution of any air transport operations which might become necessary, and only in the rarest cases did this involve carrying paratroops. As a result the training of troop-carrier units was also reorganized. The pilots were then trained to fly in main bodies (Pulk) or in a stream of bombers (Bomberstrom), that is, in irregular formations which were always three dimensional. However, it is impossible to drop parachutists from the Pulk or Bomberstrom formations; dropping parachutists requires a regular flight in formation at a uniform altitude, that is, a two-dimensional flight. The close flight order of the conventional heavy bomber formation, with its effective cross fire on all sides, is desirable for approach flights across hostile territory. It provides defense against enemy fighter planes and can be maintained until shortly before the parachute or airplane landings. If there is a probability of strong antiaircraft fire, the plane-to-plane and group-to-group spacing will have to be increased. For such tactics, intensive training of the troop-carrier pilots will be necessary, especially in the proper deployment preparatory to parachute drops. Losses during the attack on Leros in the autumn of 1943 are said to have occurred mainly because the troop carriers did not fly in regular formation and at the same altitude; during the air landing in the Ardenne in December 1944 it proved a fatal mistake that the Troop Carrier units were no longer accustomed to flying in regular formation. The experience gained both at Leros and in the Ardenne has shown that it is essential for a troop-carrier unit which is to drop parachutists to be trained to do this work, since a good part of the success of an airborne operation depends on flying in regular close formation at the same altitude.
It is obvious that the necessary training in formation flying is best achieved if the troop-carrier units are subordinated to the command of airborne troops from the very first. Up to the end of the war the German paratroop command continued to demand that it be given permanent control over the troop-carrier units, but this demand remained unfulfilled. That the troop-carrier units must be subordinate to the airborne command at least for the duration of an operation is clear to everyone. The fallacy of letting non-specialists make decisions in such matters was demonstrated in the less than brilliant direction of the Leros operation by a naval officer (the Commanding Admiral, Aegean). Likewise the Ardenne operation, which was prepared by an Air officer (the Air Force Commander, West), and carried out by an Army officer (the Commanding General, Sixth SS Panzer Army); one knew as little about an airborne operation and its difficulties as did the other.
Although the problem of cooperation between the airborne command and the command of the Troop Carrier units was solved at least temporarily during the Crete operation, the cooperation, or lack of it, between the individual airborne unit and the individual troop-carrier squadron continued to be the greatest cause of complaint by the airborne troops during the entire war. At best, the individual airborne battalion commander became personally acquainted with the commander of the transport group which flew his battalion only 2 or 3 days before the operation; as a rule, the individual soldier did not establish any contact with the flying crew of the machine which had to transport him. There was no mutual understanding of peculiarities, capabilities, and shortcomings. The 2d Battalion of the 1st Paratroop Regiment was almost completely annihilated in Crete because the battalion commander of the airborne troops greatly overestimated the flying ability of the Troop Carrier unit which was to carry his men, whereas the commander of the Troop Carrier force, on the other hand, did not understand the extremely elaborate plan of attack of the airborne commander, who was a complete stranger to him. In former times one would not require a cavalry regiment to carry out an attack when its men had only been given a short course in riding but had not been issued any horses until the night before the attack.
Next to the pilot, the most important man in the flying crew was the airborne combat observer, or, as the troops called him, the jumpmaster (Absetzer), that is, the man who gave the signal to jump.
The jumpmaster should be an extremely well-trained observer and bombardier. In the German airborne forces he was just the opposite. The jumpmasters were not taken from the flying personnel of the Luftwaffe but from the airborne troops; from time to time, the various parachute units had to release one or two men for training as jumpmasters, and with the inherent selfishness of any unit they naturally did not release their best men but rather their worst, who for some reason or other could no longer be used as paratroopers. If this reason was a combat injury, the men might still have served their purpose, but more often than not the reason was lack of personal courage or intelligence. The jumpmasters selected in this negative manner were trained at a jumpmasters’ school by instructors who had been detailed from the flying personnel of the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe did not release its best instructors for this purpose. After this deficient training the jumpmaster waited in some Troop Carrier unit, like the fifth wheel on a wagon, until he was needed for an airborne operation, meanwhile forgetting what little he had learned at the school. For, like bombing or firing a weapon, dropping paratroops is a matter of practice, of constant uninterrupted practice. The German jumpmasters were completely lacking in this practice. In almost every airborne operation the consequences were disastrous.
During the Crete operation at least one platoon of each battalion was landed incorrectly; at Maleme entire companies were dropped into the sea because the jumpmasters-out of fear, as the paratroopers afterwards claimed-had given the signal too early; during the Ardenne operation one company was dropped on the Rhine north of Bonn instead of south of Eupen, and the majority of the signal platoon of that company was dropped south of Monschau directly in front of the German lines.
Only on two occasions, the operation near Eben Emael in 1940 and the projected operation of dive-gliders against Malta in 1942, were paratroopers and troop-carrier units brought together for orientation and joint training for a considerable period prior to the operations. In both cases cooperation was excellent.
Section 3 – Technique and Tactics of Airborne Operations
The German airborne forces carried out two kinds of airborne landings, the parachute operation and the troop-carrying glider operation. After 1942, as a general principle, the parachute troops were trained in both kinds of airborne landings so that such units could be used at any time either in parachute or in glider operations, according to the tactical and terrain requirements. The JU-52 and He-111 were available as troop-carrier planes. From the JU-12 the jump was made through the door, from the He-111 through a jump hatch. Jumping from the door proved more successful since the men were more willing to jump out of the door than through the hatch in the floor of the plane and because the landings were effected at considerably smaller time intervals.
In a well-trained unit 13 men could leave the plane in not more than eight seconds. With the planes moving at a speed of 100 to 120 miles per hour and at an altitude of about 330-FT (100-M), there would be a distance of about 25 yards between men immediately after landing; that is, the group reached the ground in a fairly compact formation and could be immediately assembled by the unit commander if the terrain offered a reasonable degree of visibility. The jumping altitude was generally a little more than 330-FT. As commander of the instruction battalion, the author carried out tests at lower jump altitudes; at a jump altitude of 200-FT, the lowest that was reached, casualties through jumping injuries rose to an average of 20 percent. As soon as the jumping altitude was raised much in excess of 330-FT, the ground dispersion of the group increased. According to experience gained in the instruction battalion, a jumping altitude of about 670-FT resulted in an average dispersion of a group of 13 men amounting to 900 yards in depth and over 200 yards in width, about twice the average dispersion attained with a jumping altitude of 330-FT.
Jump casualties as well as dispersion depended largely on the velocity of surface wind, the determining of which was, or should have been, one of the most important special tasks of the combat reconnaissance directly preceding any landing operation. In general, German paratroops were only able to jump with a surface wind not over 14-MPH. Operations with a surface wind of greater velocity resulted in many jump casualties and often delayed the assembly of the landed troops for hours. The relatively large losses from jump casualties during the airborne operation against the island of Leros in the autumn of 1943 must be attributed entirely to the high surface wind. During the airborne operation in the Ardenne in December 1944 a surface wind of 36-MPH caused heavy casualties. Of the elements of one airborne unit which could still be assembled after the jump, more than 10 percent were injured in jumping, which did not, however, prevent most of them from taking part in the fighting a few hours later.
The German parachute fell short of requirements. It caused an excessive swinging motion in gusty weather, it was hard to control, and too much time was required to get out of the harness. Too much importance was probably attached to safety in jumping and too little to suitability for combat operations. The casualties which were sustained from enemy action because the soldier was unable to free himself from his harness quickly enough were far greater than the casualties which might have been caused by carelessness in opening the singlefastening harness release in the air. During the Ardenne operation I myself made an experimental jump with a captured Russian triangular parachute which despite strong gusts and a surface wind of 36-MPH brought me to earth with almost no oscillation. At the time, I still had my left arm in a temporary splint. In that wind it would have been impossible to jump with a German parachute when one’s arm was in a splint.
Too much importance was attached to the rigging of parachutes; valuable training time and time prior to an operation was lost because every man had to rig his own parachute. In my regiment I made the experiment of introducing a parachute maintenance platoon which rigged the parachutes for the entire regiment. The results were very good. Jumping experiments with unrigged parachutes have shown that in an emergency it is sufficient to make two air-resistance folds (Luftschlagfalten) and that much of the complicated packing procedure was mere fussiness.
Since heavy casualties had been sustained in Crete because the paratroopers could not reach their weapon containers or because they had to leave cover in order to unpack the containers, after 1942 regular training was given in jumping with the weapons attached to the soldier. This proved very successful. The soldier carried any one of the following items on his person :
- pistol
- submachine gun
- rifle
- light machine gun
- boxes of ammunition for machine guns and medium mortars
- machine gun carriage
- short entrenching tool
In addition, each of the following items of equipment was dropped successfully by auxiliary parachute attached to a soldier :
- medium mortar barrel
- medium mortar base plate
- Dora Radio Set
- Friedrich Radio Set
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At first the German airborne troops placed too much emphasis on the nature of the terrain at the drop point. Practical experiences during the war showed that well-trained troops can make combat jumps anywhere, except in terrain without cover where enemy fire is likely to engage the paratroops immediately after landing. Moreover, rocky terrain is particularly unfavorable. A landing in woods presents no difficulties in jumping technique, although it makes assembly very difficult after the jump. During training, German paratroopers frequently jumped into wooded areas, but in combat only once in the Ardenne operation in 1944. It is also possible to land among groups of houses, that is, on roofs. Of course, this requires special training and equipment. The paratrooper must be able to cling to the roof with the aid of grappling hooks and quickly cut an opening in the roof so that he can make his way into the house. Regular training in night jumping first began in 1942 and soon produced good results. After 1943 the requirements for the award of the paratrooper’s insignia after the completion of training included at least one jump at night. In combat, night jumps were made by the Germans on only one occasion, during the Ardenne operation. Night jumping presented two main difficulties, locating the drop point, and establishing contact after jumping. For locating the drop point which had to be reached accurately by every airplane within a few hundred yards, the radio-control procedure customary in night bombing operations was not satisfactory since it was too inaccurate and led to many errors. In practice, therefore, the Germans made use of two other procedures to supplement rather than replace radio control :
- a technical radio device, the so-called radio buoy (Funkboje)
- the incendiary-bomb field (Brandbombenfeld).
The radio buoy was a shockproof, short-range radio transmitter packed in an aerial delivery container, which was released over the drop zone by a pathfinder plane flying ahead of the Troop Carrier unit and then automatically gave each Troop Carrier the signal for dropping as soon as the aircraft had flown to within a certain area. The experiments with the radio buoy, which were carried out after 1943, had not yet been concluded to complete satisfaction by the end of the war. Therefore, during the Ardenne operation the author made use of the simpler method, the incendiary-bomb field. Two fields of incendiary bombs were laid out on the ground about one mile apart by a pathfinder plane of the troop-carrier unit, and the landing unit was to be dropped halfway between these two incendiary-bomb fields. This was not successful in the Ardenne operation, not because of any defects in the procedure but rather because of the strong American ground defenses and the unbelievably bad training of the flying personnel of the two Troop Carrier units engaged in the mission. Cooperation with pathfinders in night jumping requires the most accurate timing. Because of incorrect wind data, the pathfinders in the Ardenne operation arrived at the drop zone almost a quarter of an hour too early. In this way not only was the American air defense warned in advance, but the last transport planes were no longer guided and had to drop their men blindly.
In order to establish contact on the ground after a night jump the Germans generally used acoustical signals, such as bird calls and croaking of frogs, in preference to optical communication. Radio was used only to establish contact between company and company and between company and battalion. In the summer of 1942 experiments were made with jumps in bad weather and in fog, but without satisfactory results. The Germans distinguished between two kinds of operation with Troop Carrying gliders-gliding flight and diving flight. Great results were expected of the latter in particular. The same craft were used for both operations, either the small DFS which could carry 10 men with light equipment or the larger Go, a glider with a double tail assembly which could carry a load equivalent to one German 75-MM AT gun, including a two-man gun crew. The type of tow plane and method of towing were the same for both kinds of operation. The He-111 was mostly used as a towing aircraft. The JU-8 was best adapted for diving operations. In general, the cable tow was used to pull gliders; experiments with the rigid tow produced debatable results.
German gliders were specially equipped for diving operations. A ribbon parachute was provided as a diving brake. This consisted of several strips between which the air could pass. The glider pilot released this parachute by hand the moment the craft tipped downward. The take-off wheels were thrown off after the start, and the glider landed on a broad runner wrapped with barbed wire to increase the braking effect. This runner was directly behind the center of gravity of the glider. On some gliders designed for special types of operation there was a strong barbed hook, similar to an anchor, which dug into the ground during the landing. Finally, certain gliders were also provided with a braking rocket in the nose which could be automatically or manually ignited at the moment of landing and gave the landing machine a strong backward thrust. In some experiments a glider thus equipped was brought to a halt on a landing strip only 35 yards long.
An approach altitude of about 13000-FT seemed particularly favorable for diving operations. The glider was released 20 miles before the objective and reached the diving point in a gliding flight. As a rule, the diving angle was 70 degrees to 80 degrees, the diving speed around 125-MPH, the altitude at which the pilot had to pull out of the dive about 800-FT. In diving, the glider could elude strong ground defense by spinning for a short time or by frequently changing its diving angle diving by steps (Treppensturz) as it was called. In training pilots for diving operations the greatest difficulty was experienced in teaching them to make an accurate spot landing, in which under certain circumstances even a few yards might be important, and to recognize the right moment for pulling out of the dive. To my knowledge, it was only once that the possibilities offered by dive-gliders were put to use in combat. In 1943 seven 75-MM AT guns were dropped into the citadel of Velikie Luki, which was surrounded by the Russians, by using Go’s as dive-gliders. In connection with the projected paratroop operation against Malta in 1942, six hours before the parachute jump, a battalion under my command was supposed to land by means of dive-gliders among the British antiaircraft positions on the south coast of the island and to eliminate the British ground defense.
Over a period of months the Malta operation was prepared down to the smallest detail, and during that time the parachute troops practiced on mock-ups of these positions.
Toward the end of the war the German airborne forces clearly defined three methods of attacking an objective :
1. Jumping or landing on top of the objective;
2. Jumping or landing near the objective;
3. Jumping or landing at a distance from the objective.
According to German views, jumping or landing on top of the objective is the method primarily suited for attacking an objective which is relatively small and specially fortified against a ground attack. The Germans considered the troop-carrying dive-glider best suited for such an operation. Examples of landing on top of the objective are the capture of Fort Eben Emael north of Liege in 1940, the unsuccessful attack by elements of the airborne assault regiment (Sturmregiment) in gliders against British antiaircraft positions near Khania on the island of Crete, and the jump by my combat group at the crossroads north of Mont Rigi, in the Eifel Mountains of western Germany. Jumping near the objective is the preferred method used for the capture of a bridge or an airfield. Here the general rule is that the men jump toward the objective from all sides, so that the target to be attacked lies, so to speak, in the center of a bell-shaped formation of descending troopers. Examples of jumping near the objective are the capture of the Moordijk bridges in 1940, the capture of the Waalhafen airfield near Rotterdam in 1940, and the capture of the Maleme airfield in Crete in 1941. While, in spite of the bravest fighting, the British did not succeed in capturing the Arnhem bridge from the air in 1944, this was probably in large part because they did not jump near their objective but at a considerable distance from it.
According to German views, jumping at a distance from the objective should be resorted to chiefly when the objective is so large that it can only be reduced by slow, systematic infantry attack; inch by inch, so to speak. Whereas in jumping near the objective it is a basic rule that the attack must be made from several sides, in jumping at a distance from the objective the attack on the ground must be launched on a deep, narrow front from one direction. An example of this method was presented in the attack by the 3d Parachute Regiment against the city of Khania on the island of Crete in 1941. To be sure, it is doubtful whether such an operation would today be carried out in the same manner. Since it has been determined that it is possible for paratroopers to attack buildings from the air, the best method of attack for the purpose of capturing a village might be a combination of jumping on top of the objective and jumping near the objective rather than the procedure used in Crete in 1941; evidently the easiest way to capture a village should be from within. To date, of course, no practical experiences are available on this subject.
As a result of their experiences the Germans distinguished between two ways of dropping a parachute force: landing all elements of a unit in the same area; landing all elements of a unit at the same time.
To accomplish the landing of all elements in the same area, the troop carriers approach the drop zone in a deep, narrow formation and all paratroopers jump into the same small area. For a battalion of 600 men, a landing area measuring about 900 yards in diameter and a landing time of about 30 minutes will be normal. According to German experience, this method of landing a unit is to be used especially at night, in jumping into woods or a village or other areas with low visibility, as well as in jumping at a distance from the objective. It was, for example, the mistake of the 3d Battalion of the 3d Parachute Regiment in Crete that it failed to choose this type of landing. Its heavy casualties can in part be attributed to this fact.
If all elements of a unit are to be landed at the same time, the troop carriers make their approach in wide formation to various drop zones situated close to each other and all paratroopers jump, as nearly as possible, at the same time. In such an operation, the landing area for a battalion of 600 men will usually measure at least 2,000 yards in diameter, with a landing time of less than 15 minutes. According to German experience, this method of landing a unit is to be especially recommended when jumping into terrain which offers little cover, as well as when jumping near the objective. In Crete, the 2d Battalion of the 1st Parachute Regiment made the mistake of landing at a number of widely separated small drop points at very long time intervals. As a result of the delay, the battalion was almost completely wiped out. It can be stated as a general rule that the larger the landing area, the less time should be spent in the dropping operation. Anyone who is careless with respect to time and space will be annihilated.
Kesselring comments on the three methods of attacking an objective :
First method
Airborne landings into an area which is strongly defended against air attack can succeed only when there is absolute surprise. To be sure, the effect of weapons against parachutes in the air is generally overestimated. However, every landing harbors within itself a pronounced element of weakness which increases while troops are under the defensive fire of the enemy and which may lead to disaster during the very first moments of ground combat. The examples of Arnhem (1944) and Sicily (1943) speak only too eloquently for this; such examples will occur again and again. The attack against Fort Eben Emael can be considered as an example to the contrary. The study of this attack will enable one to recognize the possibilities and limitations of such operations.
Second method
The prerequisites for a landing near the objective are correctly described. Such landings, however, should be planned so that they are not subject to the disadvantages which occur when jumping directly into the objective. When one has to reckon with strong antiaircraft defenses, a success costing few casualties can generally be achieved only through surprise. Gliders are superior to parachutists because of their soundless approach.
Third method
In large-scale operations it will be the rule to jump at a point some distance away from the objective. One should not belittle the advantage of landing, assembling, and organizing troops in an area which is out of danger! The factor of surprise is still retained to a greater or lesser extent according to the time of day or night, the weather conditions, and the terrain. A combination of landings into and near the objective may be advisable or necessary for tactical reasons or for deception, in order to scatter the enemy fire. The same purpose may be achieved by launching diversionary attacks when landing at some distance.
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