By October 1944 the Allied forces in Western Europe had swept across France and were generally poised along the western frontier of Germany. The rapidity of the advance across France and the resulting extended front, pressed to the limits of logistical support, had quickly reduced the impetus of advance. As the problem of supply became more acute, large scale advance became impossible and the front stabilized. Checked as they were at the fixed defenses along the German border, the mounting of a full scale assault became necessary and toward this end momentous efforts were directed. However, Allied commanders, determined to maintain the initiative and to continue the drive into Germany at the earliest opportunity, launched a series of limited attacks preliminary to operations which were to mean the final destruction of all German forces west of the Rhine River.
While maintaining a relentless pressure on the enemy, supply difficulties had to be solved, regrouping had to be accomplished and units had to be refitted. In mid October, it was decided by the Supreme Commander that beginning in November the First Army was to advance to Cologne (Köln) from the vicinity of Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) while the Third Army struck at the vital Saar Basin (Saarbrucken – Sarlouis). To continue a sustained offensive, meanwhile holding a front of more than 500 miles, it was necessary to concentrate available forces, reducing to a minimum those forces holding relatively static positions. The largest of these sectors was the portion of the first US Army (1-A) line stretching through the Ardenne region from Monschau to Trier, a distance of 75 miles held by VIII Corps.
The General Situation
On December 6 1944, the First US Army issued orders for the continuation of its offensive to seize the Roer River dams, the possession of which was essential before the attack could profitably continue toward Cologne VIII Corps, on the enemy south flank, was to continue on its previous mission of conducting aggressive defense within the Corps zone and be prepared to advance to Koblenz on army order when the main attack had progressed sufficiently to lessen resistance on its Corps front. The newly arrived 106/ID was to relieve the 2/ID on the VIII Corps front thus releasing it to the V Corps, to the north, to assist in the army attack. From north to the south, the VIII Corps front on December 12 1944 was held by the 106/ID, the 28/ID, the 9/AD (less CCB and CCR) and the 4/ID. Corps reserve was composed of CCR, 9/AD, and four engineer combat battalions.
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The Ardenne
The Ardenne region through which the VIII Corps front extended was characterized by rugged, difficult terrain. High plateaus intersected by many deep cut valleys and covered by numerous heavily wooded areas increased the difficulties of large scale tactical movements, while a restricted road net made both supply for defenders and axes of advance for attackers a major problem. Two vital road junctions controlled the road nets necessary for large scale operations in the area : St Vith in the northern portion of the Corps sector, Bastogne to the south. Snow, sleet and rain added to the problems of maintaining narrow roads and made cross country movement through the area all but impossible.
Supplies of all classes were generally adequate by mid-December with several notable exceptions. Winter combat clothing was short or even non-existent and badly needed. Ammunition was closely controlled, particularly 81-MM mortar, 105-MM howitzer, 155-MM and 3-Inches AT ammunition. These types were restricted in distribution and limited in use. Facing the VIII Corps were four German Volksgrenadier divisions : the 18. Infanterie Infantry Division on the Corps north, the 62. Infanterie Division, the 352. Infanterie Division and the 212. Infanterie Division on the south. In general, these units had been regrouped or reformed during October and filled with personnel from naval and air force units as well as with older men and those with physical defects. Holding the Siegfried Line, except for the section which follows the ridge of the Schnee Eifel, these divisions were in strong, well constructed, permanent defensive positions. Protected from the harsh winter weather by pillboxes, the troops were in good physical condition; while not of the highest, their morale was good.
1 – Collected Interviews
Robert C. Ringer 591st Fld Arty Bn, Serv Btry
As Ammunition Officer for the 591-FAB [105-MM HOW], the Direct Support Battalion of the 424-IR-(106/ID), I was an observer of what went on over a wide area. Most authors if they say anything, state that the 424-IR made a disorganized withdrawal to the west.
On the contrary, both withdrawals were expertly conducted by Col A. Reid and his people. The proof is that the units in eluding the artillery lived to fight another day. The Infantry and Artillery Supply units cooperated in every way. On Dec 12 1944, all officers and men of Service Battery at the request of the 424-IR took off our goulashes and sent them to line companies lacking foot protection.
On Dec 17 1944 we sent all our machine gun ground mounts except the gun guarding the bridge at Burg Reuland. We also brought small arms ammunition forward. The Infantry and Cpt James Wells Engineers returned the favor by clearing a trail to get our guns out of Heckhalenfeld. From Dec 10 1944 to Mar 15 1945, we fired over 50000 artillery rounds. For a single day the most fired was on Dec 16 1944 with 2598 rounds and on Dec 25 1944, (Manhay) 2370 rounds. This was done with the worn out howitzers from the 2-ID.
Traversing gears were worn and frequently rounds had to be rammed in and the cases out because the tubes were in poor condition. One of the great mysteries came when Corps Artillery pulled all three of their medium and heavy artillery battalions out at noon on Dec 17 1944 to leave only our battalion and a few tanks to do the support job.
In addition to the Infantry, I would like to praise Lt Col Philip Hoover and Capt M. M. Dolitsky of our Battery for their leadership and bravery. Also from my Ammunition Train S/Sgt John Schlesser, Sgt’s Charles Datte, James Brackett and Cpl John Howard who were towers of strength in the battle.
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