The Bulge : 2nd Infantry Division (Part One)

The Roer River dams were impeding the First and Ninth Armies both by the flooded condition of the river and by the possibility that the enemy might decide to blow the dams near Schmidt and suddenly flood the countryside as the 2nd Infantry Division spearheaded a difficult attack from the south and south east to secure this chain of dams and lakes inhibiting the progress of infantry and armor.

As has been seen, the 2nd infantry Division struck through the Monschauer Forest northeast of Krinkelt - Rocherath (N-658) on December 13 1944 as part of this attack. Their mission was to pierce the Siegfried Line at Wahlerscheid (N-658) on the International Road (B-258), the one accessible route in this sector, to secure the Dreiborn Plateau (B-258 - B-266 - B-265) and seize the Roer River dams from the south.
As had been seen, the initial attack was eminently successful : it was an auspicious beginning. The customhouse at Wahlerscheid (B-258) was seized and troops were fighting their way up through the Monschauer Forest when the German counter-offensive, the Wehrmacht’s last great blow, struck in the Ardennes Forest.

The Allied forces, in order to continue the attack elsewhere without allowing the Germans time to recover and recoup their successive losses, had left some sectors of the western front comparatively thinly held in order to mass strength for offensive action elsewhere. One of these sectors lay between Monschau and Trier in the area which the 2nd Infantry Division had just vacated.
It was here the German armies of the west under Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt and by orders of Hitler made their last desperate effort to stave off disaster and prolong the war in the west.

On December 16 1944, the 9th Infantry Regiment was set to attack to exploit its penetration to the northwest toward Hofen (B-258). The 38th lnfantry Regiment continued its attack eastward toward the far edge of the Monschauer Forest. Then Von Rundstedt struck with 24 German divisions on the morning of December 16 when, after a period comparatively free of artillery, the massed concentrations of artillery fire began to fall in the Division sector, continuing ‘through the afternoon and night. Because of a murky winter fog, the Germans had been able to assemble in force with greatest secrecy in the protection of this densely wooded area. When the blow fell eight German Panzer divisions broke through the VIII Corps line along a 40-mile front. Diversionary attacks and artillery support assisted the main offensive, while paratroopers dropped in rear areas ehind the Allied lines.

Early morning of December 16 found heavy caliber artillery falling along communication routes in the Division rear areas. This presaged the beginning of the December counteroffensive when the hitherto quiet front from Monschau south to Luxembourg would flare into action as Von Rundstedt hurled two Panzer armies at the attenuated sector in an all-out effort to break through to the Meuse River and the great Allied supply sources at Liège and Anvers.

Reports came in early on that historic clay from the 99th Infantry Division sector and from V Corps, telling of pre-dawn onslaughts against the center and both flanks of the 99th Infantry Division. Heavy caliber artillery pounded the 2nd Infantry Division main supply road (MSR) at Wirtzfetd (N-669) where the Division command post was located. As the clay wore on the seriousness of the attack was readily apparent. Elements of two infantry regiments of the German 277th Volksgrenadier Division had succeeded in pushing deep salients into the 99th Infantry Division lines. Elements of the German 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend were identified in heavy fighting on the south flank of the 99th Infantry Division at Losheimergraben (N-632 - B-265).
The German 326th Division was identified at Hofen and at Monschau (B-258). To the south of Losheimergraben enemy armor and infantry penetrated deeply in the sector of the 106th Golden Lion lnfantry Division, seized villages, and threatened to cut off all communication between the 106th Infantry Division and the 99th Infantry Divisions.

On the afternoon and evening of December 16 orders for the 2nd Infantry Division from higher headquarters still designated that the units would continue their attack on December 17. ln view of alarming reports, however, the Division’s Commanding General prepared an alternate plan of disengaging and moving to a strong defensive position covering the main supply route (MSR). Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion 23rd Infantry Regiment, preparing to aid the exploitation of the Wahlerscheid breakthrough, was ordered to take up positions immediately behind the 99th Infantry Division to counterattack through that thinly held line.
Interdictory fire caught the detrucking men but they took up positions behind the 99th, while the 1st Battalion 23rd lnfantry occupied the town of Hunningen behind the 394th Infantry Regiment. It was decided that units already committed were coping with the situation, however, and the counterattack was postponed until daylight. During the early hours of the night the situation of the 2nd Infantry Division remained static. Then V Corps issued warnings of paratroop descents, and word came of attacks with armor at Losheimergraben. Driving north from Lanzerath approximately thirty tanks and one battalion of armored infantry, part of a task force of the 1 SS Panzer Division, had attacked along a railroad going north to Bullingen.

At 0700 V Corps sent word that the force was approaching Bullingen having by-passed the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry in Hunningen, and service and engineer elements of the 2nd Division in Bullingen were deploying to give battle to the German force.
Fighting against tanks with rifles, machine guns, and a few rocket launchers, the hastily assembled forces inflicted considerable damage on the panzer spearhead before being forced back into Bullingen by sheer superior firepower.
A portion of the transportation, by quick action, was evacuated to the northwest under fire, and fuel supplies essential to the German armored force were destroyed. Some units of the Division forces stationed in the town made their escape ; others set up strong points in the buildings and held out, harassing German troops and vehicles with small arms fire long after the town had been overrun and surrounded by enemy infantry and tanks. The Division air field south of Bullingen had been by-passed by the enemy force, but heavy fire around the field kept pilots from getting to the planes. The pilots hid in Bullingen until nightfall, then made their escape to the Division lines, and the planes were destroyed by Division Artillery.

In Wirtzfeld the Division commander took immediate steps to cope with the situation. Troops were alerted. Command post personnel left their posts in kitchens, motor pools, and offices to form a defensive line about the town.
The 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry. was ordered to move post-hast from its assembly area north of Rocherath to positions south of Wirtzfeld and Krinkelt. Antitank Company, 23rd Infantry, and elements of the 741st Tank Battalion and the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, then north of Krinkelt, were ordered to move on Wirtzfeld. The tremendous proportions of the attack here were the only indication that the Ardennes counteroffensive had struck. Two regiments of the 2nd Division were now far out ahead of the enemy’s line of attack. Rear echelons prepared to hold the line until the 9th and 38th Infantry Regiments could pull back and establish a defensive line at Rocherath and Krinkelt.
Disengaging action began as soon as word came that neighboring elements had been completely overrun. Withdrawal would be put into effect as soon as the operation could be coordinated. The 3rd Battalion of the 38th Infantry, then in reserve southwest of Wahlerscheid, was directed to move at once to Krinkelt. The 9th Infantry would move all three battalions to form a new line south of Wirtzfeld. The 38th Infantry would follow with its remaining two battalions to positions around Rocherath.

Together with the 2nd Battalion, 23rd lnfantry, these units would establish a continuous line from a lake west of Wirtzfeld (Butgenbach) to a point north of Rocherath. V Corps advised that the situation was chaotic and directed a withdrawal to Elsenborn covering the Eupen road (N-669 - N-67). The 2nd Division’s main supply route (MSR) was the road from Elsenborn through Butgenbach (N-647), Dom Butgenbach, Bullingen (N-632), Krinkelt, and Wahlerscheid (N-658). Maps showed a road leading from Eisenborn to Wirtzfeld by a direct route, but this road had never been completed. Engineers were now at work making this route safe for one-way traffic and were directed to devote all their energies to opening the road as the main supply (MSR) route had been cut by the enemy, at Bullingen. All vehicles except those essential to combat were ordered to move at once toward Elsenborn via Wirtzfeld using this one-way road.

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At 0730 the 99th Infantry Division announced that it was forced to abandon its command post at Butgenbach at once and move to Eisenborn. The 2nd Division’s artillery headquarters, also in Wirtzfeld, dîrected the facing about of one medium battery and one light battery to meet the impending threat from Bullingen. Rocket launcher teams were called for to provide close-in antitank defense for the command post. Four quadruple mounted fifty-caliber machine guns (4x .50) mounted on half-tracks were called forth from the 462nd Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion and were integrated into the defense of Wirtzfeld together with tank destroyers, antitank guns, and all available personnel.
At 0800 enemy half-tracks and tanks appeared closely followed by infantry, looming out of the mist on the ridge 800 yards to the south of Wirtzfeld. The combined fire of all weapons defending the town was turned upon the enemy force.
ln a 15 minutes engagement the armor was destroyed and heavy casualties were inflicted on the infantry troops. The force was part of the 1st SS Panzer Division and had been a flank guard for the main body troops passing through Bullingen. The ridge was seized by the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd lnfantry Regiment which had arrived during the engagement. No further enemy threat developed in this area for some time, although on several occasions enemy armor appeared to be massing in Bullingen for an attack against the ridge. Prompt, intense artillery lire delivered on concentrations of the enemy neutralized the threat each time it took form, and many German armored vehicles were lost as a result of this fire.

The threat to Wirtzfeld smashed, the Division commander ordered the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Infantry en route to Krinkelt to move into defensive-positions southeast and south of that town while the regimental commander of the 23rd, minus two battalions attached to the 99th Infantry Division, would take charge of all rear echelon and miscellaneous troops then in Camp Elsenborn to form a defensive line and cover south of Elsenborn.
Leaving the command post General Robertson then moved along the main supply route toward Wahlerscheid issuing verbal orders. He had decided that it would be necessary to fight a delaying action to the fast of Wirtzfeld and the south of Krinkelt to protect the only road to the rear, the newly constructed Wirtzfeld-Elsenborn road. A general defensive line was designated and the assistant division commander, General Stokes, was designated commanding officer of the Rocherath - Krinkelt sector. Colonel Ginder of the 9th Infantry was designated commanding officer of the Wirtzfeld sector.

The situation on the 99th Infantry Division front was growing steadily more critical. The 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry east of Rocherath which had expected to be committed in a counterattack was forced to hold fast to its positions. Heavy enemy attacks with infantry and armor were caving in the line. It was planned that the 393rd Infantry Regiment would pull back to either side of the 3rd Battalion to form a new line, but due to heavy pressure other elements became disorganized as tanks cut up the defending forces. No new line was ever formed. The battalion was left with both flanks exposed and in a highly unfavorable position for defense in column formation along the road.
The 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry, taking up positions around Murringen in the clark, and covering an extremely wide front, discovered on December 17 that the armored spearhead had passed them and was roaring away to their rear. As morning wore on, broken units of the 394th Infantry withdrew to the north leaving the battalion far to the advance of friendly units. The enemy made no attempt, how ever, to dislodge the battalion from its position. Armored reconnaissance vehicles approached the troops but were dispersed by supporting artillery.
At noon the 395th Infantry was ordered to hold fast of the Rocherath - Wahlerscheid road covering the flank of the Krinkelt - Rocherath positions until ordered to withdraw. The 3rd Battalion of the 395th had been repeatedly attacked at Hofen by considerable forces of armor and infantry. Fire delivered by 2nd Division Artillery had been largely instrumental in breaking up the attacks before penetrations were effected.

At noon, on December 17 word was received that the 1st Infantry Division was moving to positions south of Camp Elsenborn. Lead elements of the 26th Regimental Combat Team arrived at Camp Elsenborn at mid-clay, and during the afternoon moved into the Dom Butgenbach area, thus providing the 2nd Division with some protection to its south and south rear. However, a gap existed between the northeast flank of the 26th Infantry and the south flank of the 2nd Division: it was not closed for three days.
Shortly after noon the first elements of the enemy were noted to the left flank of the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry. German tanks and waves of infantry launched repeated attacks striking the unprotected flank. Due to the vagaries of the terrain artillery fire was not as effective at is might have been.
By now, however, V Corps was aware of the vast scale of the vast scale attack. It was learned that the Germans had attacked in force along the entire front of neighboring divisions and away to the south to Luxembourg, and that troops had actually broken through defenses of adjacent elements to the right Rank and the rear constituting a real and immediate threat to the Division. Von Rundstedt did not take half-measures : he brought everything he had to bear upon the troops. The vast scale and tremendous strength of the attack hurled against the 2nd Division front was an indication of what was happening all along the line. The 9th Infantry Regiment and the 38th Infantry Regiment were far out in German territory when the full storm broke, and the feat of bringing these two regiments all the way back, fighting first a disengaging action and then withdrawing under hostile fire against countless hazards, is one of the great chapters in 2nd Division History.

Hostile troops to the Division front included not only the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, a task force of which had burst through the 99th Division’s south flank and rolled through the 99th Division’s rear area through Honsfeld toward Bullingen. The 12th SS Panzer Division Hitler Jugend was now identified in the 99th Division sector. These were elite troops meticulously trained, who doubtless would be employed only in a section of the line where success was vital to the overall German strategy.
The 12th SS Panzer Division units were characterized by the British who fought them at Caen as “filthy beasts.” Any other appellation would be flattering. They had progressed beyond the stage which is usually described as “fanatical.” Their one aim was to kill, as brutally as possible. Prior to the attack the division commander of the HitlerJugend Division had addressed his troops as follows : “I ask of you, and expect of you, not to take any prisoners with the possible exception of some officers who might be kept alive for the purpose of questioning.” This propensity of the HitlerJugend for never taking prisoners if possible was well known from other sources than the prisoner of war interrogations. They had been responsible for the slaughter of a group of Canadian prisoners in Normandy.

The objective of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in the winter offensive gradually became clear. Major Von der Heydte, commanding officer of a parachute force of more than battalion strength, revealed that their mission was to drop behind the 2nd Infantry Division lines on the morning of December 17 and cut the Eupen - Malmedy road. Major Von der Heydte, when captured and interrogated, stated that Sepp Dietrich, commanding general of the Sixth SS Panzer Army, had told him that his unit would be relieved by an unspecified SS division by 1730 hours December 17.
An enemy map captured at Stavelot by the 30th Division which showed the zones of advance of the 1st SS Panzer Division and the 12th SS Panzer Division bore out the fact that the Sixth SS Panzer Army was to cut through to the rear in this sector to the great supply dumps of the First and Ninth Armies at Liege.
The 1st SS Panzer Division was to advance west to Aywaille, thence north along the Meuse River, while the 12th SS Panzer Division would move northwest through Eisenborn to Verviers and Liege. One prisoner from the HitlerJugend Division captured on December 17 stated that his unit’s mission was to seize a bridgehead across the Meuse River. The plan was to resupply the troops with material from the First and Ninth Army dumps, then move on toward the Channel. En route they would supply themselves from Division dumps behind the lines.
They failed to do this because the Division had placed its dumps considerably further to the rear than they had counted on. As a consequence this part of their plan fell through hopelessly. Von Rundstedt had counted on American gasoline, American trucks and tires, American guns and ammunition to keep his offensive going. All along the line the Americans guarded their supplies, destroying their dumps even after they had been abandoned, with bombers taking care of those the enemy seized intact.
A full-scale breakthrough to the rear of the First Army thus was indicated as the situation in the Division sector rapidly became more grave.
At 1600, having learned that the state of the defenses east of Rocherath was deteriorating, the division commander prepared to protect the withdrawal route from Wahlerscheid to Rocherath clown which the 38th lnfantry column, far out in the Monschau Forest, had yet to march. lntercepting the 9th lnfantry column north of Rocherath, he cut therefrom the last company of the 3rd Battalion and the 1st Battalion and directed the movement of this force to a key road junction east of Rocherath. The reinforced battalion took up positions here at nightfall and organized its defenses despite chaotic conditions on the roads.