This study is a General Staff analysis and record of the most important operational details of the XIX Corps’ successful attack on and penetration through the Siegfried Line. This successful attack against the Siegfried Line should be treated largely as a tribute to the superb fighting ability of our infantry and armored soldiers, well supported by artillery and engineers, intelligently led in a well-planned action. It has demonstrated that thorough planning, determined leadership and aggressiveness in battle, can overcome what otherwise seems to be insuperable obstacles. Both, the 30th Infantry Division and the 2nd Armored Division were battle experienced with able leadership throughout their echelons. The 29th Infantry Division, which came in during the latter phases of the operation, was also a battle experienced Division. The 30-ID had been continually in contact with the enemy since its first attack on June 15 1944 on the Vire & Taute Canal (France); it had participated in the breakthrough south of St Lô; and had withstood the German Panzer attack near Mortain in their effort to recapture Avranches. It had fought across France and Belgium, capturing Tournai and Fort Eben Emael; and was the first American unit to enter Holland then entered Germany in September to prepare for this assault on the Siegfried Line. Its Commander, Maj Gen Leland S. Hobbs, had commanded the Division from its initial commitment; its Assistant Division Commander, Artillery Commander, and other higher commanders, were all experienced and battle tried. It was a well-developed team.
Memorandum of Interview : Lance Corporal L.G. Ellis, DCM, (B-66984)
Royal Regiment of Canada, at Canadian Military Headquarters, London, October 20 1942
Operation Jubilee,Dieppe, August 19 1942
 Corporal Ellis (then Lance Corporal) is the only member of the Royal Regiment of Canada known to have crossed the sea-wall during the attack at Blue Beach who subsequently succeeded in returning to England.
 Cpl Ellis landed on Blue Beach with A Company, Royal Regiment of Canada, which landed on the right flank (i.e. the west end of the beach), as part of the first wave.
 Cpl Ellis describe the situation at Blue Beach as follow. At the head of the beach was a sea-wall perhaps 8 to 11 feet high (2.5 to 3.5 meters), on top of which there was a triple concertina wire obstacle (barbed wire). So far as his observation went, his impression was that the wall ran the whole length of the beach,i.e. from one cliff to the other across the mouth of the valley in which lies the village of Puits. Where the wall ran in front of the slope of the hill it was cut into a slope : that is, on climbing the wall a man found that there was no drop on the other side. There was a clear space perhaps 4 to 5 feet (1.2 to 1.5 meters) wide on the landward side of the wire obstacle on the wall; and beyond this was a deep and very thick obstacle of bundled wire, virtually impassable.
The Landing at Dieppe, France
August 19 1942
 No Canadian Intelligence Officer was present at the detailed examination of PSM Dumais conducted by MI.9. The information included in this memorandum was obtained at an interview which took place on October 23 1942, 2 days after P.S.M. Dumais’ return to the United Kingdom.
 Aug 19 1942
At 0700, PSM Dumais landed from an R craft on the beach at a point 50 yards east of the Casino. This craft contained 20 men from N°3 (Mortar) Platoon of Headquarters Company, les Fusiliers de Mont-Royal. Only six men had time to jump ashore before the craft containing the other 14 men and the mortars backed away and put out to sea again. PSM Dumais shouted to the Naval personnel in charge of the craft to put about again but his efforts were unsuccessful.
It is possible (it is even a certitude) that I have erased some real subscribers from this site … I have just killed a little more than 800 which were using strange name and email addy. If I have erased you – I want you to excuse me and re-register (one click) BUT don’t forget to add your name in your new account because it’s important.
Reinhard Tristan Eugen Heydrich
Born : Halle and der Saale, March 7 1904
General der Polizei
Chief of the Reich Security Office
– Geheim Stadtpolizei (Gestapo)
– Kriminalpolizei (Kripo)
– Sicherheitsdienst (SD)
Stellvertretender Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Moravia
President of the ICPC (Interpol)
Main Architect of the Holocaust
Chairman January 1942 Wannsee Conference
Eliminated : June 4 1942
Many historians regard him as the darkest figure within the Nazi elite; Adolf Hitler described him as the man with the iron heart. He was the founding head of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the main German Intelligence Organization charged with seeking out and neutralizing resistance to the Nazi Party via arrests, deportations, and murders. He helped organize the 1938 Pogrom (Kristallnacht), a series of co-ordinated attacks against Jews throughout Nazi Germany and parts of Austria on November 9/10 1938. The attacks, carried out by SA Stormtroopers and civilians, presaged the Holocaust. Upon his arrival in Prague, Heydrich sought to eliminate opposition to the Nazi occupation by suppressing Czech culture and deporting and executing members of the Czech resistance. He was directly responsible for the Einsatzgruppen, the special task forces which traveled in the wake of the German armies and murdered over one million people, including Jews, by mass shooting. Heydrich was eliminated in Prague on May 27 1942 by a British-trained team of Czech and Slovak soldiers who had been sent by the Czechoslovak government-in-exile to kill him in Operation Anthropoid. He died from his injuries a week later. Intelligence falsely linked the assassins to the villages of Lidice and Ležáky. Lidice was erased from the map; all men and boys over the age of 16 were shot, and all but a handful of its women and children were deported and killed in Nazi concentration camps.
(Source Image : www.toptenzpictures.com)
Early in 1942 the Royal Air Force bomber command, headed by Sir Arthur Harris, began an intensification of the Allies’ growing strategic air offensive against Germany. These attacks, which were aimed against factories, rail depots, dockyards, bridges, and dams and against cities and towns themselves, were intended to both destroy Germany’s war industries and to deprive its civilian population of their housing, thus sapping their will to continue the war. The characteristic feature of the new program was its emphasis on area bombing, in which the centers of towns would be the points of aim for nocturnal raids. The US 8th Air Force, based in Great Britain, also took part in the strategic offensive against Germany from January 1943. Its bombers, Flying Fortresses (B-17s) and Liberators (B-24s), attacked industrial targets in daylight. They proved, however, to be very vulnerable to German fighter attack whenever they went beyond the range of their own escort of fighters—that is to say, farther than the distance from Norfolk to Aachen: the raid against the important ball-bearing factory at Schweinfurt, for instance, on Oct 14 1943, lost 60 out of the 291 bombers participating, and 138 of those that returned were damaged. Not until December 1943 was the P-51B (Mustang III) brought into operation with the 8th Air Force – a long-range fighter that portended a change in the balance of air power. The Germans, meanwhile, continued to increase their production of aircraft and, in particular, of their highly successful fighters.
First flight : July 28, 1935 (prototype)
Model number : 299
Classification : Bomber
Span : 103 feet 9 inches
Length : 74 feet 9 inches
Gross weight : 65,000 pounds
Top speed : 287 mph
Cruising speed : 150 mph
Range (max.) : 3,750 miles
Ceiling : 35,600 feet
Power : Four 1200-horsepower Wright R-1820-97 engines
Accommodation : 2 pilots, bombardier, radio-operator, 5 gunners
Armament : 11 to 13 machine guns, 9,600-pound bomb load
What is an M-1903 and Where does it Comes From ?
The 1903 adoption of the Springfield Bolt Action was preceded by nearly 30 years of struggle and politics, using lessons learned from the recently adopted US versions of the Krag-Jørgensen rifle and the German Mauser G-98 bolt-action rifles. The M-1903 not only replaced the various versions of the US Army’s Krag, but also the Lee M-1895 and M-1885 Remington-Lee used by the US Navy and the US Marine Corps, as well as all remaining single shot trap-door Springfield M-1873. While the Krag had been issued in both a long rifle and carbine, the Springfield was issued only as a short 24 in. barrel rifle in keeping with current trends in Germany and Great Britain to eliminate long rifle and carbines.
(Source : www.warrelics.eu)
The B-17 went through several alterations in each of its design stages and variants. Of the 13 YB-17s ordered for service testing, 12 were used by the 2nd Bomb Group of Langley Field, Virginia, to develop heavy bombing techniques, and the 13th was used for flight testing at the Material Division at Wright Field, Ohio. Experiments on this aircraft led to the use of a turbo-supercharger which would become standard on the B-17 line. A 14th aircraft, the YB-17A, originally destined for ground testing only and upgraded with the turbocharger, was re-designated B-17A after testing had finished. As the production line developed, Boeing engineers continued to improve upon the basic design. To enhance performance at slower speeds, the B-17B was altered to include larger rudder and flaps. The B-17C changed from three bulged, oval shaped machine gun blisters to two flush, oval-shaped machine gun window openings and a single “bathtub” machine gun housing on the lower fuselage, that resembled the similarly-configured and located ventral defensive emplacement on the German Heinkel He 111P-series medium bomber. Models A through D of the B-17 were designed defensively, while the large-tailed B-17E was the first model primarily focused on offensive warfare.
(Image Source : www.warbirdalley.com)
This is a really nice set of photos (Belgium – Battle of the Bulge), never published before, and sent to me from my friend Frank Warner in Pottstown, USA.
Belgian civilians in Aywaille, Belgium, watch the start of an air battle in late December 1944, just north of Harzé, Belgium. Cpl Ralph Salmon of the 54th Signal Battalion took the photograph.
Army Pfc Thomas E. Warner, 54th Signal Battalion, in a jeep during training at Camp McQuaide, California, in May 1942. Warner was from Easton, Pennsylvania.
GHQ United States Army Forces Pacific
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
Guerrilla Movement in the Philippines
GHQ Far East Command Tokyo, Japan
1 March 1948
The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines is based on a number of monographs which were prepared by the Philippine Sub-section, G-2 General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, during campaign. A fragmentary mimeographed edition was initially published on 31 March by G-2, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. Corrections were made 1945, from data available since first publication. In accordance with War Department directive, 21 August 1945, subject : Historical Program for US Army Forces Pacific – the Intelligence Series, G-2 General monographs are now re-published as Volume I : United States Army Forces, Pacific Headquarters. The entire series has a secondary but important objective : to furnish our Service Schools with original material, for direct application to their training courses, in the field of practical military intelligence. In this connection, note comments by Lt Gen S. J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, Department of the Army, 12 January 1948 :
[… The scarcity of intelligence source material at the Service Schools was one of the greatest hindrances to proper intelligence training in the period between the World Wars. It is my hope that the record of World War II will be preserved in such form that this handicap will be eliminated. Future students of intelligence specialties should have at their disposal not only summarized accounts of intelligence organizations and activities such as may be included in general historical studies, but also background material for study and analysis which will challenge them to do research on the evolution of those organizations, their advantages and their weaknesses and arrive at their own conclusions as to the adaptability of our solutions to the different situations that may lie ahead. To this end I am encouraging all efforts to collect and preserve the records of intelligence operations …]-[… The SWPA produced a number of intelligence agencies and techniques required by the special geographical conditions in the theater. In many respects they could have served as models for other areas of operations …]
Combat History – 561st Field Artillery Battalion
December 17 1944 : Defying the murky skies, the tiny liaison plane circled low as Lt David E. Runden dropped a note in the battalion area. German tanks are in Setz (Belgium), heading our way, the message read. The Battle of the Bulge was on! Marshalling his crack troops for a last, all-out offensive, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt wheeled his Panzers west in a surprise move that was designed to split open the Allied forces, drive through to Liège and on to Antwerp. The 561st Field Artillery Battalion was backing up the 106th Infantry Division at the exact spot where von Rundstedt chose to break through the line. C Battery, dug in atop a hill, poured direct fire on German tanks in the valley below. Lower and lower the tubes were depressed. Gun crews were forced to dig away the earth so the tubes could be dropped even further down. Then came orders from Group to displace to the rear. Lt Col Robert C. White, battalion CO, told battery commanders to evacuate all guns, vehicles and personnel; to destroy all equipment that could not be pulled back in time. A Battery, with all of its vehicles at ordnance, was forced to leave all personal and organizational equipment behind. C Battery, which covered the withdrawal for the remainder of the battalion, found it necessary to destroy 3 guns. Not only did the battery keep the 155s blazing until the last possible moment, but it was hopeless to move the guns in the mud.